

Alhassanain (p) Network for Islamic Heritage and Thought

An Introduction To The Political Upheaval At Medina

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Preface

Dear Reader,

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Publication Secretary,

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Introduction

There was a great upheaval, a veritable revolution at Medina on the death of the Pro- phet.

Muhammad had not left the community in any doubt as to the person who was to suc- ceed him in the spiritual and temporal headship of Islam.

He had often, notably at Ghadir Khumm on the occasion of his return journey from the last hajj, declared in unequivocal terms that `Ali would succeed him, and on this occasion, he formally announced his appoint- ment as his successor.

But there was a party among his companions who were determined to seize power and place their own man on the throne.

How they achieved their object is fully described in this book: "The Political Upheaval at Medina on the Death of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam." by Aqa Muhammad Sultan Mirza, District and Sessions Judge, (Retd.).

The Book is concerned chiefly with analysing and criticising the theory on the basis of which the so-called election was arranged at Saqifah.

This theory is the dogmatic assertion, supported nei- ther by facts nor by logic, that the Prophet of Islam did not designate anyone as his successor.

From this they wanted the people to conclude that their meeting at Saqifah to select a successor of the Prophet was not only quite justified but was also absolutely necessary. All the rewards and allurements that a ruling fiction can offer and all the threats and punishments that are in its power were employed to weave this idea into the warp and woof of the very existence of the Islamic Nation.

To give it greater security and immunity from criticism, it has been taken into the fold of religion. But after all, the fact remains that this is purely a question of history.

and must be treated as such. It is the first con- cern of the historians of Islam to describe the constitution of the Islamic State founded by Muhammad; and how the head of a State is to be appointed, is the chief question relating to the constitution of that State.

It has been proved in this treatise that the arrangement by which the head of the State was appointed at Saqifah was neither open election nor honest selection.

An appeal is made to impartial historians, un- hindered by considerations of religion and un- mindful of noisy propaganda, to examine this assertion and theory critically in the light of proved facts and dictates of sound reason, and give their own finding, regardless of all con- siderations, political, religious or social.

That his "loving" companions left the dead body of the Prophet to take part in the meeting at Saqifah, that his relatives including `Ali remained by his side, overwhelmed by the great calamity that had befallen the whole nation,

that he died before noon on Monday and was not buried till late at night on Wednesday according to some 1 and till late at night on Tuesday according to a minority including Mawlawi Shibli,

2 that his funeral was not taken through the town to a secluded place in the graveyard and that on this occasion also as on other similar disputed occasions Abu Bakr came out with an alleged saying of the Prophet which no one else had heard and which has no rationalistic basis that Prophets are buried at the very place where they die, 3 and that, therefore, he was buried in the hujrah (room) of Abu Bakr's daughter,

`A'ishah, are clear indications that all was not well, and that there was something wrong somewhere. This book discloses what that something was and where it was wrong.

It must be patent to every student of History that some of those historical facts the correctness of which had for centuries been considered as finally established were eventually discovered to be incorrect,

but that it was only when the causes that had given rise to them had ceased to exist, and the passions and prejudices that had nursed them had subsided.

He often finds crystals of historical truth lying concealed in the layers of falsehood accumulated through centuries of religious fanaticism, personal prejudices or state policies of rulers who had gained the throne after a struggle, open or secret, but not based on right and justice.

Their first necessity is to gain control of History and Propaganda, and stifle any the slightest voice that is or may be raised in favour or sympathy of their defeated rivals. A criticism of their policy, nay, even of their daily movements and actions is taken to be an offence against State to be atoned for with nothing less than life.

This has been the governing principle of politicians from the age of Hannibal to the days of Hitler, and this in spite of that much-talked-of boon called Modern Civilisation which is held to be the last word on all that is best and wisest in Man. That great historian of Muslim Spain, Dr. J. A.

Conde, has laid down a maxim of universal application which may serve as a guide to all who want to write impartial history, and have an ambition to occupy the position of an impartial judge of the Past. He says:

"A sort of fatality attaching itself to human affairs would seem to command that in the relation of historical events those of the highest importance should descend to posterity through the justly suspected channels of narrations written by the conquering parties.

The mutation of empires, the most momentous revolutions and the overthrow of the most renowned dynasties seem all to be liable to this disadvantage; it was by the Romans that the history of their own aggrandisement was written;

the narration of their rivalry and sanguinary wars with the Carthaginians has come down to us from themselves; or if Greek writers have also treated the subject, these men were the tributaries and dependants of Rome, nor did they spare the flatteries best calculated to conciliate her favour.

Scipio thus appears to us the most admirable of heroes, but is not that in part because the history of his life is the work of his admirers and flatterers? It is true that the noble and illustrious Hannibal cannot look otherwise than great and glorious even in the narratives of his mortal enemies,

but if the implacable hatred and aggressive policy of Rome had not commanded the destruction of all the Punic annals, the renowned African general would doubtless appear to us under an aspect differing much from that presented by the ruthless barbarian, described by Livy and accepted by his readers as the portrait of Hannibal., ,4

What a striking resemblance with the early history of the khilafah (caliphate) and its heroes, which was the result of a struggle between two parties, one of which won the throne by a very clever coup d'etat.

Under the circumstances, it is apparent, as Conde goes on to remark that "a sound and just discrimination forbids us to content ourselves with the testimony of one side only, this requires that we compare the relations of both parties with careful impartiality, and commands us to cite them with no other purpose than that of discovering the truth."

It is really very strange that the European writers on Islamic History have entirely lost sight of this wholesome axiom based on mere common sense, and have accepted, with credulity almost criminal,

the version of the events of that troublous period as published by the party that had won the throne and displaced the rightful heirs by means of a very skillfully planned coup d'etat giving rise to a fierce and long drawn struggle between the two parties and their representatives, in which one party had almost always the upper hand.

And this in spite of their knowing, or having enough material at their disposal to know the following facts: The appointment of a successor to the Prophet at Saqifah Bani Sa'idah was not an open, sincere and peaceful affair.

It was a very skillfully arranged scheme to capture the throne after the death of the Prophet. That it was neither open and sincere nor peaceful is apparent from both (a) direct and (b) circumstantial evidence.

A. Direct Evidence

i) As soon as the Islamic movement entered its first stage of expansion, meeting and defeat- ing the rival forces in the open field, it became clear to all thinking persons that an Islamic State was in the making.

This idea grew in strength with time, and took possession of the mind of ambitious spirits; ii) The utterances of the Prophet and his conduct combined with the outstanding person- ality of `Ali and his services in the cause of Islam particularly his feats in the field of battle had not left any doubt that he had been marked out by the Prophet as his successor in the spiritual and temporal office.

There was another party which, as `Umar ibn al-Khattab rightly said 6 was bitterly opposed to this combination of nubuwwah (prophecy) and khilafah in one family, as they were averse to the rise, over other tribes, of one family, which looked to them un-precendented and intolerable.

This combined with the ambitious rivalry and jealousy of some and the personal hatred against `Ali of others whose.

relatives he had killed in the battles of Islam and who did not like his extreme zeal in the cause of Islam gave rise to a very noisy and powerful party against the house of the Prophet as represented by `Ali.

There was a third party of rich and i nfluential people who expected, as their birth right, a preferential treatment at the hands of the Caliph, and who rightly surmised that `Ali was not the proper person in this respect, as he would never sacrifice his principles of justice and equity for their sake, in fact, for any one's sake.

Naturally enough, this party wanted a pliant ruler who should pander to their wishes, and treat them as privileged people superior to the common run of men. All these factors joined together to give birth to a very powerful faction against `Ali; they had their own designs on the throne.

Though open opposition to the Prophet was impossible during his life, yet they were not entirely inactive even then. They tried secretly to secure adherents to their cause by taking advantage of every event that took place.

They pointed to the conduct and the utterances of the Prophet which appeared to them as giving undue preference to `Ali, they criticised the conduct of the Prophet when he confided his secrets to `Ali at an exclusive meeting with him, 7 their mur- murings amounted almost to open revolt when the Prophet passed a general order requiring all the companions whose houses opened into the mosque, except `Ali to close their doors.

These were thus shut out of the mosque, and the exception was galling to them.⁸ The members of this clique took a great advantage of this event to spread disaffection among the companions and to secure adherents to their cause.

They went to the extent of expressly disobeying the commands of the Prophet which seemed to them as creating opportunities for the smooth succession of `Ali.

They did not hesitate to plan the death of the Prophet. They could not conceal their chagrin, and bitterly criticised his last speech at Ghadir Khumm holding up `Ali to the sight of a huge gathering as his successor. The

Prophet himself was aware of the existence of this very powerful faction among his companions.

The Qur'anic verse hints at the existence of a party to whom the succession of `Ali was distasteful, and for that reason they were prepared to go to the extent of causing harm to the Prophet.

iii) The attempts of this party to foil the efforts of the Prophet that were intended to provide means for the peaceful succession of `Ali. Clear instances of these attempts are recorded in History.

During his last illness, the Prophet thought that `Ali might succeed peacefully if these ambitious members and leaders of this party were out of Medina at the time of his death. He, therefore, ordered all his companions except `Ali and Banu Hashim to go out and join the army under Usamah ibn Zayd that was to invade the Roman territory to avenge the defeat and death of Zayd, father of Usamah. It appears that this punitive expedition had been postponed for this occasion intentionally.

The leaders of the opposite party were shrewd enough to realise the significance of this expedition at this juncture, and refused to go. The Prophet continued urging the need of immediate march, but they kept evading the orders.

They did not move out, and the Prophet died.¹⁰ Another instance of this criminal and unabashed disobedience of the express orders of the Prophet came during the same illness when the Prophet expressed his wish to write a will appointing `Ali as his successor.

The leaders of this opposition party prohibited the people from supplying the writing material to the Prophet, saying that the Prophet was delirious and talking non-sense.¹¹ It is significant that Abu Bakr wrote his last will when he was so ill that he fainted during the dictation, so much so that `Uthman who was scribing the will wrote the name of `Umar ibn Khattab in the will while Abu bakr was unconscious,

fearing lest he might not regain conscious and die without completing the will.¹² This shows the extent to which the members of this party were prepared to go.

They would not hesitate even to forge a will and foist it upon the nation. On that occasion the charge of ravings of a diseased brain was not levelled. On the other hand, `Umar ibn al-Khattab himself took out the document and forced the people to declare allegiance to what was written in it, without announcing the contents.

13 iv) At the meeting of the Saqifah where the Caliph was to be "elected," Ali and his relatives, in fact Banu Hashim were not invited not even informed of it. 14

v) The possibility of a necessity arising to use force at the meeting at the Saqifah was not lost sight of by the actors of the Coup, and had been amply provided for. They had an armed force in Banu Sulaym ready for the occasion; and when the altercations reached a critical stage, they did intervene. `Umar ibn al-Khattab says that he was not sure of his success until the armed force of Banu Sulaym had arrived on the scene. 15 vi) The ansar (Helpers) were not averse to 'Ali's succeeding the Prophet; but the deeds and intrigues of the Opposition party of the muhaji-run (Immigrants)

had convinced them that they would never accept `Ali and would get their own man placed on the throne. The ansar, could not, of course, tolerate this. They were, therefore, forced to set up their own man, Sa'd ibn `Ubadah as a candidate for the caliphate. They 23 were not the first to move in the matter; long before they collected at the Saqifah, Abu Bakr had asked the people to come and elect a caliph from among themselves. This election speech was given just after the death of the Prophet when the speaker returned from his house at as-Sunh and saw his associate biding time by declaring, sword in hand, that he would kill anyone who would say that the Prophet had died. It is said that `Umar's extreme love for the Prophet caused him this loss of his senses. But this ebullition of exuberant love subsided at the sight of his comrade Abu Bakr, and then both of them went to the Saqifah as if, to use the words of Shibli, nothing had happened. 16 It seems that after this temporary politic loss, the senses returned with a vengeance. Shibli is forced to admit that this seeming loss was not due to any softer feelings, but that it was a political move to~arrest the news of the Prophet's 24 death from spreading.17 All this is a clear proof of the fact that this opposition party of the muhajirun and not the ansar were the first to move in the matter and start opposition against `Ali. The ansar stood up, not to oppose `Ali but to present a front against this party. The fact that after the people had been tricked or coerced into paying homage to the candidate of this party the ansar accepted the fait accompli and did not rise in revolt against the established authority who used all means in his power to guard against this eventuality has more explana- tions than one and is quite irrelevant in the present discussion. vii) This opposition party laid their plans very carefully and moved very cautiously. They foresaw possible lines of friction, and proceeded to smooth their way all round. They had their spies among the ansar, and had also tried to sow 25 dissensions among them. The speeches and the defections that took place in the meeting at the Saqifah clearly indicate that this policy of creating divisions among the enemy succeeded very well. viii) After the so-called election at the Saqifah, there was a bitter controversy, nay, open hostility, between the ansar and the muha- jirun over the question of ousting `Ali from the caliphate, and `Ali took the part of the ansar. ix) The so-called election was defective in many material points; it was not representative, no intimation of it had been given to the nation not even to the persons about whom every body knew that their leader had the best right to the khilafah and had been selected for it by the Prophet. 26 x) The election was, therefore, neither unanimous nor complete; Banu Hashim, Banu Umayyad, Banu Zuhrah, Zubayr, Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, `Abd ar-Rahman ibn Awf, `Utbah ibn Abi Lahab, Khalid ibn Saeed ibn al-'As, al- Migdad ibn `Amr, Salman al-Farsi, 'Ammar ibn Yasir, al-Buraa ibn `Azib, Ubayy ibn Ka'b, Sa` d ibn `Ubadah and his party all declined to do homage to Abu Bakr. These persons occupied high positions in the nation. xi) The first care, therefore of the opposi- tion which was now the Government Party was to win these persons over by threats or entice- ments and both were used in abundance. `Umar ibn al-Khattab went with sword and fire towards the house of `Ali, and threatened to burn the house over them if they did not come out and pay homage to the Caliph. It was reminded to him that Fatimah, the daughter of

the Prophet 27 was also in that house. He replied, "Let her be, I do not mind." 19 He also went to the mosque where those reluctant people had collected, and beat them into submission. 20 ` Ali went to the Caliph, but did not do the homage, though others had been terrified into submission. xii) The allurements offered by the Govern- ment were not less effective. The Caliph sent valuable gifts to win over the people to his side; most of them accepted them, but we hear of a widow who disdainfully refused to sell her conscience to them. 21 xiii) The arguments that were made at tlic Saqifah at the time of the so-called "election*" were concerned solely with the question whether the Caliph should be selected out of the muha- jirun or out of the ansar; they mentioned neither the good of the State as the criterion or aim of 28 the election nor the abilities of any candidate. The wishes of the Prophet were not even hinted at. All this shows beyond all doubt that the party interest and not the good of the State was the object on which they had set their heart. xiv) During his Caliphate, `Umar ibn al-Kha- ttab heard the unpleasant news of a man saying that when `Umar would die, they would win the Caliphate for `Ali by the same contrivance by which Abu Bakr had been placed on the throne. This was too unpleasant to be entertain- ed even in thought; this set him thinking, and he came to the conclusion that though the hit had secured the boundary for him, yet that it was neither lawful nor reasonable and had set a dangerous example. He, therefore, ascended the pulpit, and gave a long harangue enlarging on the defects of this coup. He summed up his lecture with the order that if 29 anyone resorted to that sort of contrivance in favour of anyone, both that man and his candidate should be slain outright. 22 No better commentary on the nature and utility of so-called election proceedings can be imagined. The author himself condemns his own work. B.

Supplement 1

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22 No better commentary on the nature and utility of so- called election proceedings can be imagined. The author himself condemns his own work.

B. Circumstantial Evidence

i) The effort of `Umar ibn al-Khattab to check the news of the Prophet's death from spreading, as he was not just then ready, his associate Abu Bakr being at as-Sunk, is very material in this enquiry.

As soon as the latter arrived, he at once started to put his plans into action. His imagination conjured up before his eyes a rally of 'Ali's friends before he himself was ready.

ii) The speech of Abu Bakr on his arrival was altogether a party speech, and not a bemoaning oration. He chastised the people for mourning over the loss of their Prophet and Benefactor; and invited them to select a successor.

iii) When they all were collected round the dead body of the Prophet, one of the spies appointed for the purpose came, and concealing himself behind a wall called `Umar ibn al-Khat- tab alone to himself, and informed him that the meeting at the Saqifah to nominate a Caliph had started.²³

iv) `Umar kept the news a secret from all except Abu Bakr whom he took with himself and both started towards Saqifah.

On the way, Abu `Ubaydah ibn Jarrah met them as if by appointment. Of all the muhajirun, these three persons alone were present at the Saqifah meeting. ²⁴ On the way, two more spies met and gave them the news of the Saqifah.

v) The next important factor is the place of the meeting. Saqifah was an out-of-the-way place where dacoits, ruffians and women mon gers used to assemble and contrive means for the execution of their nefarious projects.

It was at a distance from the mosque of the Prophet and his house. See how the plan is being kept secret from 'Ali and his relatives. The whole idea was to inflict it upon him as a fait accompli.

vi) The time chosen for action was in keeping with this plan. They knew the lofty nature of 'Ali and his high ideals. They were perfectly sure that 'Ali would not leave the dead body of the Prophet to join in the race for worldly, sordid gains.

vii) Had it been a frank, open and honest election or selection, they would have waited till the obsequies were over, and then would have invited the whole nation to a common meeting place, preferably the mosque where such political meetings had taken place before, and were taken after this incident.

There was no immediate need. They ought to have suggested to the ansar the advisability of attending first to the funeral of the Prophet.

viii) The most important point to note in this connection is that they anticipated the eventuality of using force, and made arrange- ments for it.

ix) The coup was over, in the heat and haste of the moment, the people had done homage to Abu Bakr; now they found time to repent at leisure when the right and the wrong of the matter began to dawn upon them; they began to blame each other for acting hastily and falling a prey to the machinations of a party.

This was to be provided against, and it was done. Hastily and en masse, they were sent out on foreign expeditions which developed into Persian and Roman wars.

It was in consonance. with Arab nature; Arabs were passionately fond of women, loot and fighting, and this happy stroke of statesmanship provided them with all they wanted. There was a bit of pass-time nearer home as well.

Some of the tribes did not acknowledge Abu Bakr to be the rightful Caliph; they therefore, refused to pay him zakat which was in the nature of a tax. This was a dangerous beginning which might develop into a poisonous growth.

But a mere denial of zakat cannot be a good cause for killing a Muslim. It was, there- fore, given out that they were renegades from Islam.

It was not an organised rebellion, and those people were speedily overcome. But the armies were not allowed to come to Medina. While they were on the way, they were ordered to invade Persia and Rome, though these count- ries had given no cause for this action.

Such Imperialistic wars are not permitted in Islam. But to avoid internal trouble, they had to be undertaken. This is a contrivance which has been very often adopted by statesmen in similar circumstances.

In the face of this overwhelming evidence, it would be sheer folly to deny the following facts which are fully established:-

1. The succession to the Prophet was a disputed one;

2. There were distinctly two parties to this dispute. One party put forth `Ali as the rightful claimant to the succession by virtue of his ability, kinship with the Prophet and his desig- nation by the Prophet as his heir and successor; the other party headed by certain leaders had an eye on the throne.

3. Various causes which have been detailed in the book contributed to the success of this latter party. They captured the Caliphate by means of the coup which has been mentioned above.

Henceforth, naturally enough, their main concern was to keep down the rival party by any means, fair or foul. For this purpose, the first thing that they did was to divide the Muslim nation into two factions, (i) Companions, and (ii) Ahlu'l-bayt, that is, the descen- dants of the Prophet.

The Government party identified itself with the Companions, and tried to win over all the companions by this move.

They won them over to their side by represent- ing to them that if the ruling power was once acquired by `Ali it would remain in the family of the Prophet, and they would never be able to get it, but that if it were confined to them alone, everyone of them might hope to get it in his turn.

During the proceedings at Saqifah the question of ability and fitness was not allow- ed to come in. In short, the children of the Prophet were from the very beginning con- sidered as a rival party and throughout the period of the Caliphate were treated as such.

Supplement 2

The coup at Saqifah marks the beginning of that series of calumnies, cruelties, insults, indignities, inhuman brutalities, injustices, ill-treatments, whole-sale massacres, un-justifiable and jealous surveillance,

false accusations as excuses for killings, and long periods of incarcerations to which these innocent children of the Prophet were subjected throughout the history of the Caliphate; their only sin was that they were born in his house.

Having ascertained that there were two parties, one of which won the throne and the other was considered as a dangerous rival, we proceed to find who wrote the history and how it was written.

The Government party has come to be called "Sunnis" in common parlance. We have the testimony of a great Sunni historian of India Shibli, that all the great works on Islamic His- tory known to the world have been written by the Sunnis.

Let us see how it was written and who controlled the writing of it. Mu'awiyah, the Umayyad king who was at war with `Ali throughout the period of the latter's Caliphate and who eventually wrested the Caliphate from Imam Hasan, the son of `Ali, was the first to turn his attention to History.

He got a history of the ancients written by `Ubayd whom he called from Yemen. Marwan who had been exiled by the Prophet for his anti-Islamic activi- ties and who had a great influence with `Uthman was the implacable foe of `Ali. His son `Abd al- Malik ascended the throne in 65 A.H.

He was the first Islamic king who ordered the compila- tion of Islamic History, hadith (tradition) and tafsir (Interpretation of the Qur'an).

He asked the learned people to write works on these subjects, az-Zuhri, the first celebrated historian of Islam, wrote his history under the orders of `Abd al-Malik. He also wrote works on hadith; he is one of the preceptors of al-Bukharf.

He was attached to the royal court of `Abd al-Malik, and was the tutor of his sons. Of the pupils of az-Zuhri, two persons, viz. Musa son of `Ugbah and Muhammad ibn Ishaq obtained great renown as historians. The former was a slave of the house of Zubayr.

His history, though now not available, had for a long time been the most popular work on history; its references are found in many books on this subject.

Muhammad ibn Ishaq is the most celebrated historian. His bio- graphy of the Prophet is still the accredited authority on the subject in the shape that was given to it by Ibn Hisham, and is known as the as-Sirah of Ibn Hisham. az-Zuhri is the first to compile hadith also.

Their works on history and hadith are the authorities on the basis of which works on these two subjects were written afterwards. This evidence proves the following facts:-

1. hadith and History were first compiled under the orders of the Umayyad kings;
2. The first authors were az-Zuhri and his two pupils, Musa and Muhammad;

3. These authors were attached to the royal court of the Umayyad kings.

The inveterate enmity and un-dying hatred of the house of Umayyad against Banu Hashim, chiefly the Prophet and `Ali, is much too well known to need any comment on our part.

The wars of Abu Sufyan and his son Mu'awiyah against the Prophet and `Ali respectively, the machinations of Marwan against the Prophet and Islam, his avowed enmity against `Ali, the horrible massacres at Karbala' perpetrated by the armies of Yazid in compliance with his orders are only some of the top items of a long list of such crimes.

Mu'awiyah instituted the custom of anathematising from the pulpits the memory of `Ali and his descendants which continued for full forty years until discontinued by `Umar ibn `Abd al-`Aziz who proved himself too good to live under Umayyad atmosphere, and was, therefore, poisoned by the descendants of Umayyad. 29 These were the persons under whose orders and influence the history of Islam was written.

What justice they would do to `Ali and his rights and title can be left to the best imagination to picture.

Supplement 3

Let us mention the directions under which the books of history and hadith were compiled. Mu'awiyah issued three series of orders in this connection. They are fully detailed with re- ference in the Book. He ordered that:-

i) The virtues of `Ali and the sayings of the Holy Prophet showing 'Ali's superiority over all others should be suppressed;

ii) Anyone narrating those virtues and those sayings should be severely punished, his subsidies and allowances should be suppressed, he should not be employed in State Service, social relations with him should be cut off, his houses and properties should be forfeited, and eventually, if he did not desist from this practice, he should be killed.

iii) On the other hand, all imaginable virtues should be attributed to Abu Bakr, `Umar and `Uthman; people should be encouraged, by means of rewards in money and lands, to coin sayings extolling the virtues of these personages and ascribe those sayings to the Prophet.

Such persons should be reported to the Caliph of Damascus who would fix subsidies for them, admit them to his royal court, and honour them by other means.

Details and references to authorities are given in the Book. History thus shaped and hadith thus moulded have reached us and have been circulated in the whole of the World. And this is the history which European authors and writers have made the basis and source of their works on Islam.

It must be crystal clear to all by now that Islamic History has been written by the party who won the throne on the death of the Prophet, and that there was another party who claimed that the Prophet had designated `Ali as his successor.

The next question for determination is:

whether, apart from the usual political needs and natural temptings which induce a con- querring party to give a particular shape to the events which they wish the world to know and the posterity to receive, the party which won the throne on the death of the Prophet was under any pressing need to mould the events and formulate any particular theories to justify the coup d'etat carried out by them at the Saqifah.

The need is obvious; their very existence depended on it. Cogent evidence culled from the books of this party has been furnished by the book to show that the Prophet had designated `Ali as his successor.

As Muslims, they could not disobey any order of the Prophet. The only course open to them was to deny that the Prophet had designated `Ali or anyone else as his successor.

Once they admitted that the prophet has designated anyone as his successor, all their doings and proceedings at Saqifah were to become null and void. If they were to remain on die throne, they had to make the people believe that the Prophet had not nominated or selected anyone as his successor.

It is quite simple to understand that if they had accepted the position. that the Holy Prophet had appoint- ed his own successor; their meeting at

Saqifah and the subsequent election or selection of Abu Bakr would have lost all validity, and in fact the election would have been a nullity.

Their triumph-card was the denial of the Holy Prophet's mandate of having appointed `Ali as his successor, and it was only on this glaring denial could they hoodwink the public and cling to their power.

For their existence they must coin the theory and stick to it that the Prophet did not designate anyone as his successor. This was the soul of their Saqifah Coup.

They, therefore, used all the means in their power to give currency to this view of theirs, to propagate it by means of propaganda, rewards and threats.

In fact, every allurements that royal power could hold out, every means that the man on the throne could have in his power were used and employed to instil this theory into the minds of the people and keep it alive and going on from generation to generation. We have the authority of a great Sunni divine and historian, Shibli, to prove the fact that all histories have been written by Sunni authors.

In fact, this was in keeping with the whole trend of their diplomacy. No one holding a contrary view could be allowed to write a history that would not fit in with the policy of the ruling party.

When this was the state of things, how could one expect the contrary view to find a place in the histories that were compiled and circulated under the direct supervision of the Government. Naturally the foreign countries adopted the view that was found in all the books of history written by the Muslims themselves.

It requires great courage and erudition in a foreigner to differ with the unanimous view held by almost all the native historians whose books are the only source of information to him.

I am sure that for various reasons which need not be detailed here the foreign writers of Islamic history have not bestowed that attention and care on the question of the Prophet's succession which its importance deserves.

It is obvious that no intelligent human being whom nature has provided with faculties of discernment, discrimination and judgment would accept the theory that the Prophet did not designate his successor, as foreign writers appear to have done.

To us the acceptance of this theory on non-appointment by foreign writers is as much of a problem as the most difficult question in Law or politics can be.

Why should this have happened has been considered at length in the book and cogent reasons have been given as to why this theory profounded by the Government party has found a ready acceptance in Europe in spite of its being entirely against facts and thoroughly opposed to reason.

In the name of Truth, Justice and Decency an appeal is made to the reader to survey the whole situation, weigh and judge the facts and then give his final and considered judgment. This is the only thing that is required of him who cares to go through this Book.

Established opinions and long accepted theories create a sort of prejudice in the mind against everything that appears to disturb them. But truth stands on a much higher level than Prejudice.

This book has been written primarily for European scholars of history, and the author will consider himself amply rewarded if they read this book from cover to cover even though as hostile critics.

It is certain in the end they will find themselves supporting the view which they had begun by criticising. The author has taken it upon himself to give authorities for every contested point and that too from the accredited works of the opposite party.

The value of this Book lies in its three characteristics, viz:- i) Sound Logic;

ii) Appeal to Reason; and

iii) Correct and apt references to reliable authorities.

THE END

Notes

- 1- at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, Cairo, vol.II, pp.205-207; Ibn Hisham, as-Sirah, Cairo, vol.IV, p.343. Shibli, as-Sirah an-nabawiyah, vol.11, p.143. ibid, p.144.
- 2- History of the Arabs in Spain, translated from the Spanish of Dr. J. A. Conde by Mrs. Jonathan Foster, vol.1, p.1.
- 3- History of the Dominion of the Arabs in Spain, vol.1, p.2.
- 4- Shibli. al-Faruq, , Foot-Note on pp.204-205; at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.V, pp.30-32; Ibn al- Athir, Tarikh al-kamil, vol.111, pp.24-25.
- 5- Khwand Mir, Habib assiyar, vol.I, Part Three, p.66; `Abd al-Hagq, Ashi"at al-lumu`at f sharp al-mishkat, vol.IV, p.666; `Ubaydallah, Arjah al- matalib, chap.IV, p.695.
- 6- Ahmad Hanbal, al-Musnad, vol.I, pp.175,330; vol.II, p.26; vol.IV, p.369; Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak `ala as-sahihayn, vol.III, pp.117,125,134; Ibn Kathir ash-Shami, at-Tarikh, vol.VII, p.122; as-Suyuti, ad-burr al-manthur, vol.VI, p.122; Ibn Hajar al-`Asgalani, Fath al-bari, Commentary on al-Bukhari, vol.VII, p.59.
- 7- al-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.III, pp.188-190; Husayn al-Diyar Bakri, Tarikh al-khamis, vol.II, p.120; Ibn `Asakir, at-Tarikh, vol.I, pp.117,119,121; Khwand Mir, Habib as-siyar, vol.I, Part Three, p.77; Ibn al-Athir, Tarikh al-kamil, vol.II, pp. 120-121.
- 8- Same as Note no.9; `Abd al-Hagq, Madarij an- nubuwwah, vol.II, pp.530-531; Shahrastani, al- Milal waTnihal; Ibn Abil-Hadid, Commentary on Nahj al-balaghah, vol.I, p.53; vol.II, p.20.
- 9- Sahih of al-Bukhari, in seven places, e.g. chap. on Kitab al-`ilm , chap. on `Kitab al-jihad; Sahih of Muslim, Cairo, vol.V, pp.75-76; Ahmad Hanbal, al-Musnad, vol.I, pp.355 356; Shahrastani, al-Milal wal -nihal, on the margin of `Kitab al-Fisal, by Ibn Hazm, p.23.
- 10- at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.IV, p.25; Ibn al-Athir, Tarikh al-kamil, vol.II, p.163; Husayn al-Diyar Bakri, Tarikh al-khamis, vol. II, p.268.
- 11- at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.IV, p.52; Ibn al-Athir, Tarikh al-kamil, vol.II, p.163; Ibn Qutaybah, al-Imamah waTsiyasah, vol.I, p.19.
- 12- al-Muhib at-Tabari, ar-Riyad an-nadirah, vol.1, Part Two, chap.XIII, p.165; at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.II, p.208; Ibn `Asakir, at-Tarikh, Part "Tah- dhib."Life of Bashir ibn Sa'd, vol.111, p.263. at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.111, pp.209-210. Shibli, al-Faruq, Part One, pp.65-66.
- 13- ibid, p.65.
- 14- Khwand Mir, Habib as-siyar, vol.IV, p.2; Ibn Abil-Hadid, Commentary on Nahj al-balaghah, vol.11, pp.8,10,13,15,18.
- 15- at-`Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.III, p.198; al-Mas'ndi, Muruj adh-dhahab, vol.II, p.24; Abul-Fida', at-Tarikh (al-Mukhtasar), vol.1, p.156; Ibn `Abd al-Barr, al-Isti ab, Life of `Abdallah ibn Abi Quha- fah, vol.I. p.345.
- 16- Ibn Qutaybah, al-Imamah wa alsiyasah, vol.I, pp.11-12.
- 17- Ibn Sad, Tabagat, vol.111, Part One, p.129; Ibn Abi-Hadtd, Commentary on Nahj al-balaghah, vol.1, pp.74,132-133; Ibn Qutaybah, al-Imamah wa Tsiyasah, vol.I, p.15.

- 18- at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.I11, pp.200,210; Ibn al- Athir, Tarikh al-kamil, vol.I1, p.124; al-Bukhari, Bab: Rajm al-hubla idha ahsanat; Ibn Kathir ash- Shami, at-Tarikh, vol.V, p.245; Ibn Hajar Makki, as-Sawa`iq al-muhriqah, Part One, chap.1, p.5. Shibli, al-Faruq, vol.1, p.66; Abu Ya'la,al-Musnad, cited by Shibli.
- 19- al-Muhib at-Tabari, ar-Riyad an-nadirah, vol.1, Part Two, chap.XIII, p.165; at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol. 111, p.208; Jalal ad-Din Abu'l-Faraj ibn Jawzi, on the Life of `Umar, chap.XXVI, pp.32, 35. Same as above.
- 20- The Arabic-Persian Dictionaries: Muntakhab al- lughat; Ghiyas al-lughat; Chiragh-i hidayat on the margin of Ghiyas al-lughat.
- 21- Shibli, al-Ma'mun, Part 1, p.61.
- 22- For this account of the eimpilation and writing of History and Hadith, see Shibli, as-Shah an-naba- wiyah, vol.1, Part One, pp.13, 15-17.
- 23- Amir `Ali, History of the Saracens, chap.X, pp. 126-127.
- 24- Mas'udi, Muruj adh-dhahab, vol.I, p.28.

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