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Direct and Indirect Speech Acts in English

Major Bachelor's Thesis

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Brno 2006

I hereby declare that I have worked on this Bachelor Thesis independently, using only primary and secondary sources listed in the bibliography.

20th April 2006 in Brno:

I wish to express many thanks to my supervisor, Mgr. Jan Chovanec, Ph.D., for his kind and valuable advice, help and support.

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Introduction

This thesis deals with the theory of speech acts and the issue of indirectness in English. It sums up and comments on theoretical definitions and assumptions concerning the theory of speech acts given by some linguists and language philosophers. This work further discusses the usage of speech acts in various conversational situations, putting the accent particularly on indirectness and its application in the language of drama.

In the first three chapters, I am going to deal with the theoretical approach towards the speech acts. I will comment on the types of speech acts, I will explain how it is possible that the hearer successfully decodes a non-literal, implied message, what conditions must be met in order that the hearer succeeds in this process of decoding and I will suggest why people use indirectness in everyday communication.

In the last chapter, I will then concentrate on indirectness in the discourse of drama. For my analysis, I have chosen the play **Life x 3** by a contemporary French author Yasmina Reza whose pieces are often based rather on exchanges between the characters than on some kind of complicated plot.

In *Life x 3*, I have identified four types of exchanges: **direct speech acts** motivated by **direct speech acts**, **indirect speech acts** motivated by **direct speech acts**, **direct speech acts** motivated by **indirect speech acts** and finally **indirect speech acts** motivated by **indirect speech acts**. They occur in various proportions, the most frequent being the direct-indirect exchanges and the least frequent being the indirect-direct exchanges.

Grounded on empirical data, I have found out that the play is based rather on indirectness since there are 62 exchanges out of which at least one is indirect, the total number of exchanges being 89.

Direct-direct, indirect-indirect and direct-indirect contributions are quite frequent throughout the play. It seems that the hearer in these exchanges accepts the strategy proposed by the speaker and chooses to pursue likewise, or in the case of direct-indirect exchanges, he decides to make his utterance more polite or evasive so that he does not offend the speaker. In direct-indirect exchanges, the hearer sometimes has more reasons to use indirectness (power, competing goals, desire to make his language more interesting).

On the other hand, indirect-direct strategy is somehow dispreferred as, based on this play, directness after an indirect utterance may initiate an argument between the speakers.

1. Language, Speech Acts and Performatives

Language is an inseparable part of our everyday lives. It is the main tool used to transmit messages, to communicate ideas, thoughts and opinions. It situates us in the society we live in; it is a social affair which creates and further determines our position in all kinds of various social networks and institutions.

In certain circumstances we are literally dependent on its appropriate usage and there are moments when we need to be understood quite correctly. Language is involved in nearly all fields of human activity and maybe that is why language and linguistic communication have become a widely discussed topic among linguists, lawyers, psychologists and philosophers.

According to an American language philosopher J.R. Searle speaking a language is performing **speech acts**, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions or making promises. Searle states that all linguistic communication involves linguistic (speech) acts. In other words, speech acts are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication. (1976, 16) They are not mere artificial linguistic constructs as it may seem, their understanding together with the acquaintance of context in which they are performed are often essential for decoding the whole utterance and its proper meaning. The speech acts are used in standard quotidian exchanges as well as in jokes or drama for instance.

The problem of speech acts was pioneered by another American language philosopher J.L. Austin. His observations were delivered at Harvard University in 1955 as the William James Lectures which were posthumously published in his famous book *How to Do Things with Words*. It is Austin who introduces basic terms and areas to study and distinguishes locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. As Lyons puts it: Austin's main purpose was to challenge the view that the only philosophically (and also linguistically) interesting function of language was that of making true or false statements.(Lyons, 173) Austin proves that there are undoubtedly more functions language can exercise. The theory of speech acts thus comes to being and Austin's research becomes a cornerstone for his followers.

It is Austin who introduces basic terms and areas to study and he also comes up with a new category of utterances – the performatives.

Performatives are historically the first speech acts to be examined within the theory of speech acts. Austin defines a performative as an utterance which contains a special type of verb (a performative verb) by force of which it performs an action. In other words, in using a performative, a person is not just saying something but is actually doing something (Wardhaugh: 1992: 283). Austin further states that a performative, unlike a constative, cannot be true or false (it can only be felicitous or infelicitous) and that it does not describe, report or constate anything. He also claims that from the grammatical point of view, a performative is a first person indicative active sentence in the simple present tense. This criterion is ambiguous though and that is why, in order to distinguish the performative use from other possible uses of first person

indicative active pattern, Austin introduces a *hereby* test since he finds out that performative verbs only can collocate with this adverb.

1. a. *I hereby resign from the post of the President of the Czech Republic.*

b. *I hereby get up at seven o'clock in the morning every day.*

While the first sentence would make sense under specific conditions, uttering of the second would be rather strange. From this it follows that (1a) is a performative, (1b) is not.

Having defined performatives, Austin then draws a basic distinction between them. He distinguishes two general groups - **explicit** and **implicit performatives**.

1.1. Explicit and Implicit Performatives

An explicit performative is one in which the utterance inscription contains an expression that makes explicit what kind of act is being performed (Lyons, 1981: 175). An explicit performative includes a performative verb and mainly therefore, as Thomas (1995: 47) claims, it can be seen to be a mechanism which allows the speaker to remove any possibility of misunderstanding the force behind an utterance.

2. a. *I order you to leave.*

b. *Will you leave?*

In the first example, the speaker utters a sentence with an imperative proposition and with the purpose to make the hearer leave. The speaker uses a performative verb and thus completely avoids any possible misunderstanding. The message is clear here.

The second utterance (2b) is rather ambiguous without an appropriate context. It can be understood in two different ways: it can be either taken literally, as a yes/no question, or non-literally as an indirect request or even command to leave. The hearer can become confused and he does not always have to decode the speaker's intention successfully. (2b) is an implicit or primary performative. Working on Lyon's assumption, this is non-explicit, in terms of the definition given above, in that there is no expression in the utterance-inscription itself which makes explicit the fact that this is to be taken as a request rather than a yes/no question (Lyons, 1981: 176).

The explicit and implicit versions are not equivalent. Uttering the explicit performative version of a command has much more serious impact than uttering the implicit version (Yule, 1996: 52). Thomas adds to this that people therefore often avoid using an explicit performative since in many circumstances it seems to imply an unequal power relationship or particular set of rights on the part of the speaker (1995: 48). This can be seen in the following examples:

3. a. *Speak. Who began this? On thy love, I charge thee. (Othello, 2.3.177)*

b. *I dub thee knight.*

In (3a) Othello speaks to his ensign Iago and asks him who initiated a recent fight. Othello addresses Iago from the position of strength and power and he therefore uses the explicit performative '*I charge thee*'. Iago understands what is being communicated and carefully explains that he does not know who had started it.

In (3b) the situation is different. In this example it is rather the particular set of rights on the part of the speaker which enable him to use an explicit performative. Dubbing was the ceremony whereby the candidate's initiation into knighthood was completed. It could only be carried out by the king or any entitled seigneur who shall strike the candidate three times with the flax of the blade, first upon the left shoulder, next upon the right shoulder and finally upon the top of the head while saying *I dub thee once.. I dub thee twice...I dub thee Knight.*¹ The ceremony was completed when the knight received spurs and a belt as tokens of chivalry. Levinson (: 230) declares that 'performative sentences achieve their corresponding actions because there are specific conventions linking the words to institutional procedures'. The institutional procedures are not always the same, they differ considerably in different historical periods and cultures (e.g. the institution of marriage in western and eastern societies). Austin states that it is also necessary for the procedure and the performative to be executed in appropriate circumstances in order to be successful.

Shiffrin (1994: 51), commenting on Austin's observations, adds: "The circumstances allowing an act are varied: they include the existence of 'an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect', the presence of 'particular persons and circumstances', 'the correct and complete execution of a procedure', and (when appropriate to the act) 'certain thoughts, feelings, or intentions'." These circumstances are more often called **felicity conditions**.

1.2. Felicity Conditions

The term of felicity conditions was proposed by Austin who defines them as follows (Austin, 1962: 14 – 15):

There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.

The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and completely.

Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must intend so to conduct themselves, and further must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

Linguistic literature concerning the theory of speech acts often deals with Austin's example of marriage in connection with felicity conditions. Thomas for instance closely describes the institution of marriage and states that in western societies "this conventional procedure involves a man and a woman, who are not debarred from marrying for any reason, presenting themselves before an authorized person (minister of religion or registrar), in an authorized place (place of worship or registry place), at an approved time (certain days or times are excluded) accompanied by a minimum of two witnesses. They must go through a specified form of marriage: the marriage is not legal unless certain declarations are made and unless certain words

have been spoken” (Thomas, 1995: 38). Only then are all the felicity conditions met and the act is considered valid.

However, this procedure is often not universal; the customs vary throughout countries and cultures. In Islamic world for example, the ceremony of marriage is considerably different. The bride cannot act herself, she needs a wali (male relative) to represent her in concluding the marital contract as without his presence the marriage would be invalid and illegal. The declarations and words spoken are also culture specific and thus different from the formulas common in Europe.²

For all that, there must exist a certain conventional procedure with appropriate circumstances and persons involved, it must be executed correctly and completely, the persons must have necessary thoughts, feelings and intentions and if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must do it. (Thomas, 1995: 37) Generally, only with these felicity conditions met the act is fully valid.

The term of felicity conditions is still in use and it is not restricted only to performatives anymore. As Yule (Yule, 1996: 50) observes, felicity conditions cover expected or appropriate circumstances for the performance of a speech act to be recognized as intended. He then, working on originally Searle’s assumptions, proposes further classification of felicity conditions into five classes: **general conditions**, **content conditions**, **preparatory conditions**, **sincerity conditions** and **essential conditions**. According to Yule (Yule,1996:50), **general conditions** presuppose the participants’ knowledge of the language being used and his non-playacting, **content conditions** concern the appropriate content of an utterance, **preparatory conditions** deal with differences of various illocutionary acts (e.g. those of promising or warning), **sincerity conditions** count with speaker’s intention to carry out a certain act and **essential conditions** ‘combine with a specification of what must be in the utterance content, the context, and the speaker’s intentions, in order for a specific act to be appropriately (felicitously) performed’.

In connection with felicity conditions as well, Austin later realizes that the category of performatives and constatives is not sufficient and thus, in an attempt to replace it by a general theory of speech acts, he ‘isolates three basic senses in which in saying something one is doing something, and hence three kinds of acts that are simultaneously performed’ (Levinson: 236): **the locutionary, illocutioanary and perlocutionary acts**.

2. The Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts

The locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are, in fact, three basic components with the help of which a speech act is formed. Leech (Leech, 1983: 199) briefly defines them like this:

locutionary act: performing an act of saying something

illocutionary act: performing an act in saying something

perlocutionary act: performing an act by saying something

The locutionary act can be viewed as a mere uttering of some words in certain language, while the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts convey a more complicated message for the hearer. An illocutionary act communicates the speaker's intentions behind the locution and a perlocutionary act reveals the effect the speaker wants to exercise over the hearer.

This can be demonstrated on a simple example:

4. *Would you close the door, please?*

The surface form, and also the locutionary act, of this utterance is a question with a clear content (Close the door.) The illocutionary act conveys a request from the part of the speaker and the perlocutionary act expresses the speaker's desire that the hearer should go and close the door.

But the individual elements cannot be always separated that easily. Bach and Harnish say that they are intimately related in a large measure (Bach and Harnish, 1979: 3). However, for better understanding of their function within a speech act, I am going to treat them individually first.

2.1. Locutionary Acts

This component of the speech act is probably the least ambiguous. Bach and Harnish (Bach and Harnish 1979: 19), commenting on Austin's work, point out that Austin distinguishes three aspects of the locutionary act.

Austin claims that to say anything is:

always to perform the act of uttering certain noises (a phonetic act)

always to perform the act of uttering certain vocables or words (a phatic act)

generally to perform the act of using that [sentence] or its constituents with a certain more or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'reference', which together are equivalent to 'meaning' (rhetic act)

From this division it follows that the locutionary act comprises other three "sub-acts": phonetic, phatic and rhetic. This distinction as well as the notion of locutionary act in general was often criticized by Austin's followers. Searle even completely rejects Austin's division and proposes his own instead (Searle, 1968: 405). Searle (Searle, 1968: 412) warns that Austin's rhetic act is nothing else but a reformulated description of the illocutionary act and he therefore suggests another term, the so-called propositional act which expresses the proposition (a neutral phrase without illocutionary force). In other words, a proposition is the content of the utterance.

Wardhaugh offers this explanation. Propositional acts are those matters having to do with referring and predicating: we use language to refer to

matters in the world and to make predictions about such matters (Wardhaugh, 1992: 285). Propositional acts cannot occur alone since the speech act would not be complete. The proposition is thus expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act. What is essential to note here is that not all illocutionary acts must necessarily have a proposition (utterances expressing states such as ‘Ouch!’ or ‘Damn!’ are “propositionless” as Searle observes (Searle 1976:30)). Having defined the proposition and propositional acts, Searle modifies Austin’s ideas and states that there are utterance acts (utterance acts are similar to Austin’s phonetic and phatic “sub-acts”, Searle (1976:24) defines them as mere uttering morphemes, words and sentences), propositional acts and illocutionary acts.

Utterance acts together with propositional acts are an inherent part of the theory of speech acts but what linguists concentrate on the most is undoubtedly the issue of **illocutionary acts**.

2.2. Illocutionary Acts

Illocutionary acts are considered the core of the theory of speech acts. As already suggested above, an illocutionary act is the action performed by the speaker in producing a given utterance. The illocutionary act is closely connected with speaker’s intentions, e.g. stating, questioning, promising, requesting, giving commands, threatening and many others. As Yule (Yule, 1996: 48) claims, the illocutionary act is thus performed via the communicative force of an utterance which is also generally known as illocutionary force of the utterance. Basically, the illocutionary act indicates how the whole utterance is to be taken in the conversation.

Sometimes it is not easy to determine what kind of illocutionary act the speaker performs. To hint his intentions and to show how the proposition should be taken the speaker uses many indications, ranging from the most obvious ones, such as unambiguous performative verbs, to the more opaque ones, among which mainly various paralinguistic features (stress, timbre and intonation) and word order should be mentioned. All these hints or let’s say factors influencing the meaning of the utterance are called Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices, or IFID as Yule, referring to previous Searle’s work, calls them (Yule, 1996: 49).

In order to correctly decode the illocutionary act performed by the speaker, it is also necessary for the hearer to be acquainted with the context the speech act occurs in. Mey (Mey, 1993: 139) says that one should not believe a speech act to be taking place, before one has considered, or possibly created, the appropriate context.

Another important thing, which should not be forgotten while encoding or decoding speech acts, is that certain speech acts can be culture-specific and that is why they cannot be employed universally. Mey shows this on French and American conventions. He uses a French sentence to demonstrate the cultural differences.

5. *Mais vous ne comprenez pas!* (literally, ‘But you don’t understand!’)

While a Frenchman considers this sentence fully acceptable, an American could be offended if addressed in similar way as he could take it as a taunt aimed at the level of his comprehension or intelligence (Mey, 1993: 133). The interpretation of speech acts differs throughout the cultures

and the illocutionary act performed by the speaker can be easily misinterpreted by a member of different cultural background.

From this it also follows that 'the illocutionary speech act is communicatively successful only if the speaker's illocutionary intention is recognized by the hearer. These intentions are essentially communicative because the fulfilment of illocutionary intentions consists in hearer's understanding. Not only are such intentions reflexive. Their fulfillment consists in their recognition'(Bach and Harnish, 1979: 15).

Nevertheless, as already pointed out in the previous example, there are cases when the hearer fails to recognize the speaker's intentions and he therefore wrongly interprets the speaker's utterance. This misunderstanding may lead to funny situations and hence it is often an unfailing source for various jokes.

I have chosen one illustrative example to comment on a bit more.



Figure 1. ³

This picture suggests that the speaker (the man in this case) has uttered a question asking how the woman's day was. The context and other circumstances are not specified, but let's suppose that their conversation takes place somewhere in the office and that they are colleagues. The man obviously meant his question just as a polite conventional formula with a rather phatic function, not wanting to know any other details. The woman takes him aback a bit since she starts giving him a lot of unsolicited information. She obviously did not catch the intentions behind his words and therefore the man, surprised at her extensive answer, carefully reminds her that she was only supposed to say 'Fine.' The communication is uncomfortable for him. The illocutionary act he uttered was not recognized by the woman. The question we should logically ask is 'Why?'

Talbot (1998: 140) declares that men and women happen to have different interactional styles and misunderstandings occur because they are not aware of them. She even compares the differences in the way men and women talk to already discussed cross-cultural differences. And thus it is possible to see this example as an analogy to that French-American interpretation of the ‘*Mais vous ne comperenez pas!*’ case. The woman is as if from different cultural milieu and she therefore misinterprets the man’s question.

It should be clear by now that the issue of illocutionary acts is sometimes quite complicated because one and the same utterance can have more illocutionary forces (meanings) depending on the IFIDs, the context, the conventions and other factors.

6. *The door is there.*

This simple declarative sentence (6) in the form of statement can be interpreted in at least two ways. It can be either understood literally as a reply to the question ‘Where is the way out?’ or possibly ‘Where is the door?’ or it can be taken as an indirect request to ask somebody to leave. The sentence has thus two illocutionary forces which, even if they are different, have a common proposition (content). The former case is called a **direct speech act**, the latter an **indirect speech act**. It depends on the speaker and on the contextual situation which one he will choose to convey in his speech.

Similarly, one illocutionary act can have more utterance acts (or locutionary acts according to Austin) as in:

7. a. *Can you close the door?*
- b. *Will you close the door?*
- c. *Could you close the door?*
- d. *Would you close the door?*
- e. *Can’t you close the door?*
- f. *Won’t you close the door?* (Hernandez, 2002: 262)

All the utterances in (7) are indirect requests, they all have a common illocutionary force, that of requesting.

There are hundreds or thousands of illocutionary acts and that is why, for better understanding and orientation, some linguists proposed their classification. The classification which is the most cited in the linguistic literature is that of Searle who divides illocutionary (speech) acts into five major categories (to define them, I will use Levinson’s explanations (Levinson,)):

Representatives are such utterances which commit the hearer to the truth of the expressed proposition (e.g. asserting, concluding)

8. *The name of the British queen is Elizabeth.*

Directives are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something (e.g. ordering, requesting)

9. *Would you make me a cup of tea?*

Commissives commit the speaker to some future course of action (e.g. promising, offering)

10. *I promise to come at eight and cook a nice dinner for you.*

Expressives express a psychological state (e.g. thanking, congratulating)

11. *Thank you for your kind offer.*

Declarations effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions (e.g. christening, declaring war)

12. *I bequeath all my property to my beloved fiancée.*

Searle's classification is not exhaustive and according to Levinson (Levinson, 1983: 240), it lacks a principled basis. Yet, Searle's classification helped to become aware of basic types of illocutionary acts and their potential **perlocutionary effect** on the hearer.

2.3. Perlocutionary Acts

Perlocutionary acts, Austin's last element in the three-fold definition of speech acts, are performed with the intention of producing a further effect on the hearer. Sometimes it may seem that perlocutionary acts do not differ from illocutionary acts very much, yet there is one important feature which tells them apart. There are two levels of success in performing illocutionary and perlocutionary acts which can be best explained on a simple example.

13. *Would you close the door?*

Considered merely as an illocutionary act (a request in this case), the act is successful if the hearer recognizes that he should close the door, but as a perlocutionary act it succeeds only if he actually closes it.

There are many utterances with the purpose to effect the hearer in some way or other, some convey the information directly, others are more careful or polite and they use **indirectness** to transmit the message.

3. Indirectness

Indirectness is a widely used conversational strategy. People tend to use indirect speech acts mainly in connection with politeness (Leech, 1983: 108) since they thus diminish the unpleasant message contained in requests and orders for instance. Therefore similar utterances as in (14) are often employed.

14. *It's very hot in here.*

In this example the speaker explains or even excuses the reason why he makes a request (Open the window!). Ardissono argues that the speakers often prefer indirect speech acts so that they do not infringe the hearer's face, which might be the case here too. Ardissono claims that sometimes direct addresses may even appear impolite as in 'Would you lend me some money?' and 'Lend me some money!' The latter variant would be absolutely unacceptable in some contexts.

However, politeness is not the only motivation for indirectness. People also use indirect strategies when they want to make their speech more interesting, when they want to reach goals different from their partners' or when they want to increase the force of the message communicated (Thomas, 1995: 143). These factors will be further discussed in chapter five when analyzing Yasmina Reza's play *Life x 3*.

The motivation for indirectness seems to be more or less clear but the question most linguists deal with is: How is it possible that the hearer understands what the speaker actually communicates by his utterance?

To answer this cardinal question, the theory of implicature and the cooperative principle have been developed.

3.1. The Theory of Implicature, the Cooperative Principle and Maxims

The author of this theory, an English language philosopher Paul Grice, scientifically clarifies the subject of mutual speaker-hearer understanding and says that we are able to converse with one another because we recognize common goals in conversation and specific ways of achieving these goals. In any conversation, only certain kinds of moves are possible at any particular time because of the constraints that operate to govern exchanges (Wardahaugh, 1992: 289).

Grice comes up with the theory of implicature in which he tries to explain in detail how the hearer gets from what is said to what is meant. According to Grice, there is a set of over-arching assumptions guiding the conduct of conversation which arise from basic rational consideration (Levinson, 1983: 101). Levinson also adds to this that the assumptions can be understood as guidelines leading the course of the conversation (Levinson, 1983: 101). Grice calls them maxims and states that they together form the cooperative principle: 'Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.' (taken from Schiffrin, 1994: 194).

Grice distinguishes four basic maxims:

Maxim of Quantity:

Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

Do not say what you believe to be false.

Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.

Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous.

Avoid obscurity of expression.

Avoid ambiguity.

Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

Be orderly. (Schiffrin, 1994: 194)

What can be derived from the cooperative principle is the fact that maxims should be theoretically involved in every conversation. However, in everyday communication, the conversational situation is not always ideal and that is why the maxims are often not fully observed. There are several ways in which the speaker can fail to observe one or more maxims. These are flouting (the speaker blatantly fails to observe a maxim), violating (unostentatious non-observance of a maxim), infringing (the speaker fails to observe a maxim without any intentions), suspending and opting out (the speaker indicates unwillingness to cooperate in the way the maxim requires) of a maxim (Thomas, 1995: 64).

As a result consequent upon non-observance of certain maxims, the speaker's utterance may communicate something completely different from what was said. In other words, the utterance can imply something.

This finding helps to explain and comprehend indirect contributions. Although seeming inappropriate at the first sight, the hearer presupposes that the speaker has in mind and maintains the cooperative principle. The hearer, and sometimes also the speaker, thus understands what is actually being said.

This can be demonstrated on the following example:

15. A: *Wouldn't you want to be able to hunt later on the first day of hunting?*

B: I said Saturday, so obviously that's the day I prefer. (Tannen, 1990: 159)

This exchange is taken from an interview going on between husband and wife who are planning a dinner for their friends. A is trying to set the date while B gives reasons why he is busy. A loses patience and makes an indirect request in the form of a yes/no question. B decodes it and also reacts indirectly. A flouts the maxim of Manner and B flouts the maxim of Quantity (A is not brief, B is more informative than required).

Even though this exchange may seem strange as B does not utter a response relevant to a yes/no question, the message is clear for A as she relies on B's conversational cooperation. She knows hence that B's response must have some sort of interrelationship towards her utterance and she looks for non-literal, indirect meaning.

The cooperative principle, together with other contextual circumstances, helps in establishing the actual meaning of the utterance.

Indirectness is thus not an uncommon conversational strategy. On the contrary, it is widely used not only in everyday communication or jokes as we saw earlier, but also in literature and drama in the first place.

The employment of indirect strategies can be observed for example in *Life x 3*, a play by contemporary French author Yasmina Reza, I have chosen for my analysis.

4. Life x 3

Life x 3 is a comedy-drama written by a contemporary French author Yasmina Reza, the English translation was provided by Christopher Hampton. The plot is very simple and almost unimportant, Reza focuses particularly on the language of her four characters, and the play is therefore convenient for a linguistic analysis.

Reza introduces two married couples: Henri and Sonia and Hubert and Inès. Henri is not a very successful research scientist who has invited his superior, Hubert Finidori (with his wife, Inès), over for dinner the next night. But suddenly the Finidori's show up - a day early.⁴ The hostess is completely unprepared to receive guests, which creates many absurd situations throughout the whole play. The play has three acts; in each the central embarrassing situation is replayed with slight changes. I have chosen the first act (I will further use the word play instead of act) to deal with in my work as I find it most interesting from the point of view of indirectness.

The play contains four types of exchanges: **direct speech acts** motivated by **direct speech acts**, **indirect speech acts** motivated by **direct speech acts**, **direct speech acts** motivated by **indirect speech acts** and finally **indirect speech acts** motivated by **indirect speech acts**.

The proportion of individual types in the play is outlined in the following table:

	Direct speech act (H)	Indirect speech act (H)
<i>Direct speech act</i> (S)	27	28
<i>Indirect speech act</i> (S)	9	25

Table 1. Proportion of individual types of exchanges

The table above suggests that Life x 3 is a play based rather on indirect speech acts since there are 62 exchanges out of which at least one is indirect, the total number of exchanges being 89.

There is a variety of reasons for the use of universal indirectness and hence also for indirectness in this piece of theatre. Thomas (1995) introduces the main factors which influence the application of indirect speech acts in the discourse; she claims that the motivation for indirectness includes:

- The desire to make one's language more/less interesting
- To increase the force of one's message
- Competing goals
- Politeness (Thomas, 1995: 143)

These four observations can be traced in the indirect utterances of Reza's play, too. However, in large measure, it is not only the purpose but also the context, the shared background situation (Searle, 1979: 48), the speaker-

hearer relationship, their education and social status which determine whether the characters, and people in general, choose to use indirect speech acts or not.

“Conversational situations are never just conversational. They are governed by social rules as well as conversational rules. Insofar as these are mutually recognized – whether institutionally imposed, determined by the persons involved, or personally imposed and reflective of the individuals involved – they provide guidelines within which acts (linguistic and otherwise) are performed and perceived.” (Bach and Harnish, 1979: 105)

4.1. Direct speech Acts As a Reaction to Direct Speech Acts

There are only 27 direct - direct exchanges in the play. Their role is more or less informative and sober. To a direct question there is a direct answer. The cooperative principle together with at least three Grice's maxims, those of Quality, Relation and Manner, is always observed and thus there is little space for any possible misunderstanding.

Yes/no questions

Henri: *Should I peel it?*

Sonia: *Yes.* (18)

Henri: *Have you closed the doors?*

Sonia: *Yes.* (33)

Henri: *You didn't go to see him?*

Sonia: *No.* (28)

Henri: *Oh, yes? Is this very recent?*

Hubert: *Yes, yes, this morning: 'On the Flatness of Galaxy Halos'.* (23)

In the first three utterances above, the speaker forms a direct question with one intention – to get a satisfactory and unequivocal answer. The hearer understands what information the speaker is asking for and forms an adequate response. As for yes/no question, it is of course either a clear *yes* or a clear *no*. The four maxims are fully observed. The question and also the answer are both perfectly clear.

Yet, the fourth exchange is a bit different from the preceding two. The speaker utters a direct yes/no question but the hearer apart from answering mere *yes* adds another piece of information (*this morning* and the name of an article *On the Flatness of Galaxy Halos*). The hearer provides perhaps more information than was originally needed and asked for and he thus violates Grice's maxim of Quantity. In the context of the play, the hearer is a cunning intellectual who wants to discourage and humiliate his colleague and I suppose that is why he quickly adds other unsolicited facts. Hubert possibly also tries to make his utterance more interesting and a bare *yes* to a yes/no question would thus not be enough to fulfill this role.

Wh-questions

Wh-questions are, in this case, very similar to yes/no questions: A direct question is formed in order to get a specific answer (information) different from yes or no.

Inès: *How old is he?*

Sonia. *Six.* (34)

Hubert: *Where were you before?*

Sonia: *Montparnasse.* (24)

Henri: *What's that?*

Sonia: *The Fox and the Hound. You put the Fox and the Hound on for him.* (39)

In the examples noted above, the speaker is interested in one particular piece of information – age in the first exchange, name of the city in the second and identification of the sound playing in the background in the third. The hearer reacts using a direct speech act as well, directly giving the information requested. In the third example, the hearer again provides more information than is originally needed. This time, the purpose is not mischievousness but the hearer's intention to remind the speaker of his past actions.

The direct-direct exchanges are quite brief, with no implicature involved, with no additional level of meaning. The hearer does not have to look for what the speaker might have meant by uttering such and such sentence, everything in their interaction is expressed explicitly. Misunderstandings hardly occur.

4.2. Indirect Speech As a Reaction to Direct Speech Acts

The play contains 28 direct-indirect exchanges, they represent the most numerous group within the play. I have chosen only those I find particularly interesting to comment on. Generally, it could be said that indirectness in this type of exchanges is used to increase the force of one's message, to convey politeness, some kind of explanation or refusal and sometimes irony or sarcasm.

I would like to present at least these examples to be considered:

Henri: *Hubert, am I doomed?*

Hubert:....*You're going through a rough patch.* (48)

In this case, the speaker, Henri, positively asks a direct yes/no question. From this follows that the hearer, Hubert, should utter a response containing *yes* or *no*, but this is not the case. The hearer is well aware of the fact that he cannot say a positive *yes*, even if he probably longs to do so, as he would violate certain conventions observed in the society. As Bach and Harnish (1984:95) claim: "Not only do people expect one another to act in certain mutually recognized ways, as determined (at least in part) by mutually recognized rules governing mutually recognized types of persons and types of situations, they expect others to expect them to act in these ways." The hearer would not only offend the speaker but he would also lose his face within the discussion group which is of course undesirable. As Bach and Harnish (1984: 99) observe: "The speaker compromises the presumption (maxim) of manner in order to avoid the offense to the hearer or the embarrassment to himself that explicit language would engender." And therefore, the hearer chooses to use an indirect strategy, relying on the speaker's ability to read between the lines.

The result here is that the speaker feels humiliated and in order to get a straight answer, asks the same question a few more times again. He finally succeeds and the hearer responds less indirectly, uttering the not very courageous and quiet '*A bit.*' (which is still remarkably indirect) some minutes later. As already suggested above, in avoiding the direct yes, the hearer intentionally flouts the maxims of Manner, Relation and perhaps also

that of Quality and makes the speaker look for another explanation. Henri knows very well what Hubert is conveying but he refuses to believe it and for that reason he keeps repeating the same question again and again. His ego is hurt.

Inès: *And are they (the halos) flat, do you think?* (S)

Henri: *I think they're ten times as thin as they're long.* (H) (70)

In this second example, the motivation for indirectness is somehow different. It is not politeness which is exercised in the hearer's response; Henri rather wants to sound scientific, interesting and important. His objective is to win recognition and that is why he desperately tries not to use simple language. He realizes that a research scientist should speak in a cultivated and sophisticated manner. Knowing that Inès is an uneducated housewife, he feels she could admire him for his scientific assumptions and thus he decides not to answer with simple *yes*. Henri flouts the maxim of Quantity - he is more informative than necessary. Inès, in fact, is not interested in halos, she is just trying to ease the awkwardness of silence. According to Bach and Harnish, her primary aim is obviously to fill the air and pass the time with a minimum of discomfort.

Sonia: *I'd have done better to receive them in my dressing gown!*

Henri: *Congratulations, Sonia! Well done!* (68)

The speaker, Sonia, is annoyed with the current state of affairs, she thinks she did not have to bother to receive the guests with such a pomp and she mentions her ideas directly. The hearer, her husband Henri, is angry with her for saying this. He wants to be polite since he hopes Hubert could help him with his career. Henri utters an expressive which might seem uncooperative at the first sight, yet Henri's reaction is perfectly relevant. Although Austin would even call this an insincere or void act, the act is not void at all.

“The observation that the speaker (Henri in this example) has said something which is manifestly untrue, combined with the assumption that the CP is in operation sets in motion the search for an implicature” (Thomas, 1995: 63). Indeed, the utterance cannot be taken literally, the hearer's actual intention is not to congratulate his wife Sonia whereby he just proves that he does not observe the maxim of Quality (he says what he believes to be false). Henri wants to express the opposite and he deliberately makes an ironical remark. But the words themselves and the appropriate context are not enough to transmit the right message, something else is still needed to make the utterance function. As Searle points out, to understand what is really meant, not only the context but also other illocutionary force indicators, including mainly stress and intonation in this case, are essential. (Searle 1976: 30) The irony would not be understood without them.

Inès: *Perhaps he should read it before he starts getting upset.*

Hubert: *Inès, my love, don't interrupt when you don't know what you're talking about.* (46)

The first utterance pronounced by Inès is a reaction to Hubert's announcement concerning an article he saw published in a scientific magazine. Her contribution can be taken as a suggestion or advice. I don't think it is really meant for someone, Inès simply feels like saying

something. Hubert, her husband, cuts her down to size and even though he tries to be polite in front of their hosts, his neat words are clearly suggesting something not very positive and what is more, something quite rude. His utterance could be without any doubts interpreted like this: Shut up, you silly goose! Nevertheless, Hubert would not say anything of this sort since he would be afraid to lose face, he utters the propositional act indirectly trying to sound very polite and thus indirectly communicating the illocutionary force of imperative or even threat. Inès, knowing his husband, ignores him.

Hubert: *Check before you get in a state about it.*

Henri: *I left my laptop at the Institute.* (62)

Hubert utters a clear imperative sentence explicitly stating what Henri should do. Henri answers indirectly giving an explanation why he cannot execute what Hubert advised him. Henri's utterance might seem unrelated to Hubert's but "in indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer." (Searle, 1979: 31) Henri does not say 'I cannot', but it is obvious from his contribution that it is impossible for him to check the article Hubert is speaking about - without a laptop he cannot connect to the internet. The primary illocutionary act 'I cannot' thus makes an internal and perhaps inseparable part of the literal secondary illocutionary *I left my laptop at the Institute*. While uttering the actual speech act '*I left my laptop at the Institute*' Henri also relies on Hubert's nonlinguistic knowledge concerning computers and the internet.

Direct-indirect exchanges are the most frequent within the play. This suggests that their use is somehow preferable. The hearer (the second speaker) often responds indirectly in an attempt to make his answer more gentle so that it complies with set social rules, to sound more interesting or to increase the force of his message. His choice of an indirect strategy is premeditated and deliberate.

4.3. Direct Speech As a Reaction to Indirect Speech Acts

There are only 9 direct-indirect exchanges out of 89 exchanges in total. This number indicates that the direct-indirect strategy might be dispreferred by the speakers. Is it really so? Why is the direct-indirect strategy not sought after? These are the main questions I would like to deal with in this section.

Henri: *He wants a cuddle. Just a little cuddle.*

Sonia: *No.* (71)

Henri's utterance could be interpreted as an imperative or request (Go and give him a cuddle!). In saying '*He (our son) wants a cuddle. Just a little cuddle.*' Henri performs two illocutionary acts: a primary illocutionary act of request which is communicated by way of performing a secondary illocutionary act of making a statement. He performs the secondary illocutionary act by way of uttering a sentence the literal meaning of which is such that its literal utterance constitutes a performance of that illocutionary act. (Searle, 1979: 33) In other words, the secondary illocutionary act is literal while the primary illocutionary act is not.

The speaker, Sonia, apparently understands what message her husband tries to transmit, she succeeds in decoding that he is making a request since she answers *no*. Her response is short but absolutely clear. In fact, her *no* accompanied with certain paralinguistic features could be taken as an invitation to an argument. And indeed, after Sonia's brief *no* the couple starts quarrelling. Her direct *no* after a nice indirect request made Henry annoyed.

Henri: *Will you go and get dressed, Sonia?*

Sonia: *No. (76)*

This example is very similar to the preceding one. Henri utters an indirect request whose surface form resembles a question. Taken from a different perspective, the primary illocutionary act is again a request, the second illocutionary act is a yes/no question this time. Sonia answers *no* again. In this exchange, it is not easy to say whether or not she has decoded the primary illocutionary act of request produced by the speaker because the answer to both, to the yes/no question and to the request, might be *no*. However, everything indicates that she has decoded the speaker's intentions correctly. It seems that Sonia wants to make Henry angry. She seems to resist his power. Requests like these typically do not normally call for any reply and if they do, then it tends to be in the affirmative or some avoidance strategy. And therefore it is easy for the situation to escalate into a quarrel – in a quarrel politeness, maxims, etc. are not observed. This time the dispute is evaded because the Finidoris are waiting outside, and therefore Henri only reacts in uttering '*How can you be so selfish?*' Under normal conditions, it is probable that the row would have started.

Henri: *I told him you were coming.*

Sonia: *I'm not going in there one more time, I hope that's clear. (78)*

In this example, Henri repeats his strategy from the first indirect-direct exchange. He communicates a request. Sonia, once again, correctly decodes the primary illocutionary act behind the statement and utters a corresponding answer. Her answer is a bit stronger than it was in the preceding two exchanges. She clearly does not observe the maxims of Manner (she is not brief enough) and Quantity (her contribution is perhaps more informative than required). Sonia's answer provokes Henri to criticize her and once again, it might be taken as some kind of rudiment for an argument.

Hubert: *See, and she knows what she's talking about!*

Inès: *I'm not offended, you know. (77)*

The situation in this example is slightly different from those commented on above. Hubert utters an indirect speech act which is to be understood as ironical or even sarcastic. The context and already mentioned paralinguistic features are an important part which helps to establish the meaning of the whole utterance. Without an appropriate context and Hubert's intention to mock Inès, the sentence could have been taken literally. It is the speaker who can influence the meaning. "What is added in the indirect cases is not any additional or different sentence meaning, but additional speaker meaning." (Searle, 1979: 42)

Hubert: *Oh, look, there's one more Wotsit!*

Sonia: *Eat it!* (72)

The first part of Hubert's utterance with hidden ironical meaning is intended for Inès; Hubert scornfully explains to her what Henri meant with *topical*. The second part of Hubert's utterance seems a bit out of place, he suddenly and quite unexpectedly completely changes the subject of conversation by saying '*Oh, look, there's one more Wotsit!*' and thus flouts the maxim of Relation. "The maxim of Relation is exploited by making a response or observation which is obviously irrelevant to the topic in hand (e.g. by abruptly changing the subject)." (Thomas, 1995: 70) And this is exactly what Hubert does.

Bach and Harnish state that changing the subject is a common conversational practice with a range of possible purposes. One may change the subject to avoid revealing a secret, to keep from committing oneself on something, to avoid excessive dwelling on a subject painful to oneself or to the hearer, to confuse the hearer, to test the hearer's interest or persistence, or simply to liven up the conversation (1984: 99). Hubert's purposes for changing the topic can be connected with his decision not to put down his wife anymore. For him, this conversation is over and besides, he seems to really have a soft spot for Wotsits. The primary illocutionary act in this case is a question (Can I have the last Wotsit?), the secondary literal illocutionary act is a statement describing the situation about Wotsits. Sonia, the hostess, recognizes the primary illocutionary act in Hubert's contribution and utters '*Eat it!*'. The indirectness was revealed and properly treated. The hearer understood the speaker's message.

The indirect-direct exchanges are scarce in the play (9 out of 92). From the examples in the play it follows that a direct utterance employed after an indirect one might **provoke an argument** (there are 6 cases in 9 which could be taken as a possible impulse for an argument; three of potential 'argument-starters' are specified in more detail above). This might be the main reason, and the numbers empirically prove it, why the characters avoid using this conversational strategy.

4.4. Indirect Speech As a Reaction to Indirect Speech Acts

The category of indirect-indirect exchanges contains 25 items and thus becomes the third most commonly used strategy throughout the play. It is interesting to note that this strategy is employed chiefly between the partners of one couple (between Henri and Sonia and between Hubert and Inès with Henri and Sonia using indirectness-indirectness the most frequently). There is one indirect speech act which is not recognized by the hearer.

Henri: *He wants a biscuit.*

Sonia: *He's just cleaned his teeth.* (83)

According to Searle's theory of indirect speech acts, Henri utters an indirect primary illocutionary act in the form of request (Go and give him a biscuit!) combined with a literal secondary act – the actual statement '*He wants a biscuit.*' Sonia decodes the utterance and forms an indirect speech act herself. The non-literal primary illocutionary act '*He's just cleaned his teeth.*' is a clear refusal here. The literal secondary illocutionary act gives a reason why she refuses to fulfill the directive uttered by Henri supposing

that everybody knows it is not advisable to eat anything having cleaned one's teeth. She probably uses indirectness in order to increase the force of her message as Thomas suggests in similar examples. Both the hearer and the speaker succeeded in encoding and decoding their intentions.

Henri: *He's agreed to a slice of apple.*

Sonia: *He's not having any apple, he's not having anything, you don't eat in bed, the subject is closed.* (89)

This exchange is very similar to the previous one, only the force of Sonia's indirect speech act is even stronger here since she supports her refusal with a more detailed explanation why she is not going to give him anything to eat and she closes her contribution with '*the subject is closed*' implying that she considers the debate to be over and that she is not willing to discuss it anymore. The speaker and the hearer managed to encode and decode their messages again.

Hubert: *It's twenty past nine.*

Inès: *I cannot turn up with a ladder in my stocking.* (92)

This exchange takes place between Hubert and Inès, the other couple. Hubert's contribution is to be taken as follows: The primary illocutionary act is an appeal or perhaps a request towards Inès (Hurry up lest we will be late, Inès!) and the literal secondary illocutionary act explains that it is getting late. Inès decodes Henri's indirect appeal and reacts with an irritated indirect response. Inès indirectly conveys in 'I'm not going to hurry, I need a new pair of stockings.' Hubert understands her utterance and tries to persuade her that nobody will notice. The indirectness was recognized and well comprehended by both of them.

Inès: *Whose fault is that?*

Hubert: *I'm not going to put up with this recital.* (80)

In this case Inès utters an indirect speech act with a surface form (secondary illocutionary act) of a question which could be interpreted as a reproach or accusation (It's your fault!). She obviously does not ask a question and Hubert is well aware of this fact. He therefore, as if indirectly, defends himself against Inès' reproach and indirectly forms an imperative (Stop it!). The communication between them was successful.

Sonia: *Have they heard us?*

Henri: *Why, what did we say?* (104)

This last example I would like to present here is a bit special as Henri's decoding of Sonia's utterance fails this time. Sonia forms a question (surface form, secondary illocutionary act) which is in fact supposed to imply something completely different. Sonia actually indirectly suggests: 'Let's not let them in.' Henri is apparently nervous and taken aback by unexpected visitors and maybe therefore he does not reveal Sonia's indirect proposal. He only reacts to the secondary illocutionary act in Sonia's utterance and he therefore almost automatically utters another question as an indirect response to Sonia's interrogative. The exchange fails, the speaker's message is not uncovered. Searle observes that one cannot always tell from what the sentence means what the speaker really means by its utterance. (Searle, 1979: 40) And this seems to be the case, Henri relies purely on the

sentence meaning and he fails to detect another additional speaker's indirect message hidden inside the sentence.

4.5. Data Evaluation

According to the analysis of indirectness carried out on the play *Life x 3* by Yasmina Reza, I came to the conclusion that **the second speaker** (usually denoted as a hearer in my work) **often accepts the strategy suggested by the first speaker**. This observation can be empirically proved since there are 27 direct-direct and 25 indirect-indirect exchanges which makes the total of 52 exchanges in the play (their proportion is thus more than a half).

The second speaker also frequently follows a direct-indirect strategy making his answer more reticent or polite. The reason for this linguistic behaviour is, among others, most probably embedded in social rules set by the cultural community. There are 28 direct-indirect exchanges in the play.

The indirect-direct strategy seems to be unpopular. There are only 9 indirect-direct exchanges in the play out of which 6 could be accounted for possible 'argument-starters'. It is hence clear that the speakers deliberately attempt to avoid it.

The motivation for indirectness is miscellaneous. When using indirect utterances, the speakers often want to sound interesting (this phenomenon is demonstrable in Hubert's and Henri's contributions), they try to increase the force of his message (this often happens in the exchanges between the partners within one couple) and last but not least they observe the principles of politeness. These three factors for using indirectness devised by Jenny Thomas (she mentions also competing goals) are the most common in the play.

Proportionally to the number of individual contributions, indirectness is mainly used by Hubert who probably uses it not only in order to be polite, to increase the force of his utterance or to sound interesting but also to sound superior and scientific. He believes himself to be a more educated person than the others involved in the conversation.

The play contains 64 exchanges out of which at least one is indirect which proves that indirect speech acts are employed more extensively than direct speech acts. Levinson even points out that 'most usages are indirect'. (Levinson, 1983: 264)

Conclusion

The thesis deals with the speech acts and its main terms within the framework of the theory of direct and indirect speech acts. It further explains indirectness and its usage in every day communication, jokes and drama.

In my practical analysis, I then focused mainly on directness and indirectness in drama, based on *Life x 3*, a play by Yasmina Reza.

The play contains four types of exchanges and thus four types of speaker-hearer strategies: **direct-direct**, **direct-indirect**, **indirect-direct** and **indirect-indirect**. The proportion of individual strategies differs, yet there is one which is obviously dispreferred – an **indirect-direct strategy**, the number of indirect-direct exchanges being only 9 out of 89 contributions.

I came to the conclusion that the speakers probably avoid this strategy since a direct response to an indirect strategy may provoke an argument (there are 6 exchanges out of 9 which could be understood as an ‘argument-starter’) which might be the main reason why the speakers rather choose not to answer directly in this case.

The numbers of direct-direct (27), direct-indirect (28) and indirect-indirect (25) exchanges are more or less balanced and therefore it could be said that the hearer either accepts the strategy proposed by the speaker (direct-direct, indirect-indirect) or he decides to make his contribution less straight and therefore gives preference to indirectness. He thus not only shows respect to the speaker, but he also expresses politeness or sometimes even unwillingness to quarrel. Using indirectness, the speaker also proves his ability to toy with the language and make his words sound more interesting.

People are well aware of the fact that some, mostly negative, information cannot or should not be expressed explicitly or directly and that indirect strategies should be applied. Indirectness nowadays plays a vital role in our communication.

Czech résumé

V bakalářské práci nazvané *Přímé a nepřímé řečové akty v angličtině* jsem se pokusila nastínit hlavní aspekty teorie řečových aktů a s tím související problematiku nepřímých výpovědí v angličtině. Práce shrnuje a komentuje teoretické definice klíčových pojmů a soustředí se na použití řečových aktů v různých konverzačních situacích s důrazem na použití přímých a nepřímých strategií v jazyce dramatu.

První tři kapitoly s názvem „Jazyk, řečové akty a performativy“, „Lokuční, ilokuční a perlokuční akty“ a „Nepřímost“ jsou teoretické. Tyto kapitoly prezentují klasifikaci řečových aktů a dále objasňují, jaké podmínky a okolnosti musí být splněny, aby druhý mluvčí správně pochopil nepřímou výpověď prvního mluvčího. V těchto kapitolách jsou následně zmíněny důvody, proč mluvčí v některých situacích volí raději nepřímost.

Čtvrtá kapitola „Life x 3“ je věnovaná praktické ukázce přímosti a nepřímosti v dramatu. K analýze je použita hra *Life x 3* současné francouzské autorky Yasminy Rezy, jejíž literární dílo je často postaveno zejména na slovní interakci postav.

Hra (tedy její první akt, který je předmětem zkoumání) obsahuje čtyři typy promluv: přímé - přímé, přímé - nepřímé, nepřímé - přímé a nepřímé - nepřímé. Tyto promluvy jsou ve hře zastoupeny v různém poměru. Největší procento zaujímají promluvy přímé – nepřímé, nejmenší naopak nepřímé – přímé.

Poměr přímých – přímých, přímých – nepřímých a nepřímých – nepřímých promluv se však v zásadě neliší. Markantní rozdíl nastává právě v počtu promluv nepřímých - přímých. Tento rozdíl zřejmě způsobuje fakt, že přímost druhého mluvčího v nepřímé – přímé promluvě může být pokládána za výzvu k hádce

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Appendix

1. a. I hereby resign from the post of the President of the Czech Republic.
b. I hereby get up at seven o'clock in the morning every day
2. a. I order you to leave.
b. Will you leave?
3. a. Speak. Who began this? On thy love, I charge thee. (Othello, 2.3.177)
b. I dub thee knight.
4. Would you close the door, please?
5. Mais vous ne comperenez pas! (literally, 'But you don't understand!') (Mey, 1993: 133)
6. The door is there.
- 7.a. Can you close the door?
b. Will you close the door?
c. Could you close the door?
d. Would you close the door?
e. Can't you close the door?
f. Won't you close the door? (Hernandez, 2002: 262)
8. The name of the British queen is Elizabeth.
9. Would you make me a cup of tea?
10. I promise to come at eight and cook a nice dinner for you.
11. Thank you for your kind offer.
12. I bequeath all my property to my beloved fiancée.
13. Would you close the door?
14. It's very hot in here.
15. A: Wouldn't you want to be able to hunt later on the first day of hunting?
B: I said Saturday, so obviously that's the day I prefer. (Tannen, 1990: 159)

DIRECT-DIRECT

16. **Henri:** What's the matter with him?
Sonia: He wants a biscuit.
17. **Henri:** Why is he crying?
Sonia: Because I said no.
18. **Henri:** Should I peel it?
Sonia: Yes.
19. **Henri:** Now what's the matter with him?
Sonia: He wants a whole apple.
20. **Sonia:** This is a catastrophe.
Henri: Yes.
21. **Sonia:** What are we going to do?
Henri: Go and ... go and fix yourself up a bit.
22. **Hubert:** So, where have you got to with the flatness of halos?
Henri: I've finished. I'm submitting the paper before the end of the month.
23. **Henri:** Oh, yes? Is this very recent?

- Hubert:** Yes, yes, this morning: ‘On the Flatness of Galactic Halos.’
24. **Henri:** What’s the matter with him, Sonia?
Sonia: He wants chocolate fingers.
25. **Henri:** What was his approach? Modelisation of observations or numerical simulation?
Hubert: I think it was modelisation, but as I said.....
26. **Inès:** What’s your subject in layman’s terms?
Henri: Are the dark matters of galactic halos flat?
27. **Henri:** What’s he doing?
Sonia: Crying. I closed all the doors so we wouldn’t hear him.
28. **Henri:** You didn’t go to see him?
Sonia: No.
29. **Inès:** Ad what difference does it make if the halo’s not round any more?
Henri: To our every day life, none.
30. **Henri:** When you look at the Milky Way does it seem to form a straight line?
Inès: Yes.
31. **Inès:** How old is he?
Sonia: Six.
32. **Sonia:** And you, Inès, what do you do?
Inès: Nothing. That’s to say, hundreds of things, I’ve never been as busy as I have since I stopped working.
33. **Henri:** Have you closed the door?
Sonia: Yes.
34. **Hubert:** Where were you before?
Sonia: Montparnasse.
35. **Hubert:** And you no longer practice as a lawyer?
Sonia: No.
36. **Henri:** What does Serge Bloch have to do with this?
Inès: Well, he was flooded out first....
37. **Henri:** Did you really say I was doomed?
Hubert: Of course not!
38. **Henri:** And d you think I still have a chance to be published?
Hubert: Certainly! Perhaps not in A.P.J., but in A. and A. Or in M.N.R.A.S., I don’t see why not.
39. **Henri:** What’s that?
Sonia: The Fox and the Hound. You put the Fox and the Hound on for him.
40. **Inès:** He has his own TV?
Henri: Not a TV, a mini-cassette, he’s allowed to listen to a mini-cassette every evening in bed.
41. **Henri:** At least go and change.
Sonia: No.
42. **Henri:** What’s the difference?
Hubert: Perhaps he’s dealing with visible matter. I just ran my eye over the abstract.

DIRECT-INDIRECT

43. **Henri:** You tell him.
Sonia: Why didn't you?
44. **Sonia:** Who's that?
Henri: I'll go and have a look.
45. **Henri:** I'm going and I'm not coming back.
Sonia: Who's stopping you?
46. **Inès:** Perhaps he should read it before he starts getting upset.
Hubert: Inès, my love, don't interrupt when you don't know what you're talking about.
47. **Henri:** Before I let you go, Hubert, I need to know if you think I'm a crawler?!
- Hubert:** You're keeping him awake, Henri.
48. **Henri:** Hubert, be honest, am I doomed?
Hubert:... You're going through a rough patch.
49. **Sonia:** Are we going to let them in?
Henri: They know we're here.
50. **Sonia:** Who's doomed? My husband?
Hubert: Henri? Doomed? Are you joking? He's the only one who thinks he's doomed! We were talking about our friend Serge Bloch, who, after being flooded out....
51. **Sonia:** Are there any more Wotsits?
Henri: Who for, for Arnaud?
52. **Hubert:** What idea darling?
Inès: Hubert, please, stop trying to police everything what I say.
53. **Hubert:** Look, Inès, don't interfere....
Inès: I'll interfere in any way I like, will you stop trying to muzzle me?
54. **Henri:** Go and give me a kiss, go and tell him you're sorry and lost all sense of proportion
Sonia: Let go of me!
55. **Henri:** You tell him.
Sonia: Stop it.
56. **Henri:** The Finidoris!
Sonia: It's tomorrow!
57. **Inès:** Is it important for halos to be honest?
Hubert: Feminine logic!
58. **Henri:** Go and give him a cuddle.
Sonia: How many more times are we supposed to go back in his room?
59. **Henri:** What did you say to him?
Sonia: To scream his head off?
60. **Sonia:** An example of the Finidorian tone?
Henri: Sonia!
61. **Henri:** What's Hubert Finidori got to do with it?
Sonia: I'd like to record your voice when you're on the phone with him. Your kow-towing, your obsequious tone of voice.
62. **Hubert:** Check before you get in a state about it.

Henri: I left my laptop at the Institute.

63. **Henri:** What's happening? Every time you go in there, he cries.

Sonia: What's that supposed to mean?

64. **Hubert:** Haven' you got a nail-varnish? To stop the ladder?

Inès: And look like some tramp?

65. **Henri:** Give him a slice of apple.

Sonia: He doesn't want a slice of apple, he wants a biscuit, and in any case he's not getting anything. You don't eat in bed, you eat at the table, you don't eat in bed after you've cleaned your teeth and now I need to look through this file, I have a ten o'clock meeting in the morning.

66. **Henri:** Three years without publishing, only to see your subject refused because it's already been covered, what do you call that? A scientific death warrant?

Hubert: We're not in America.

67. **Hubert:** Was that the last packet?

Sonia: We could give him some cheese.

68. **Sonia:** I'd have done better to receive them in my washing gown.

Henri: Congratulations, Sonia! Well done!

69. **Henri:** But when my son is crying, I prefer to hear it.

Sonia: You maybe, but not necessarily our guests.

70. **Inès:** And are they flat, do you think?

Henri: I think they're ten times as thin as they are long.

INDIRECT-DIRECT

71. **Henri:** He wants a cuddle. Just a little cuddle.
Sonia: No.
72. **Hubert:** Oh, look, there's one more Wotsit!
Sonia: Eat it.
73. **Henri:** Sonia, our friends are still hungry.
Sonia: Would you like some Wotsits?
74. **Henri:** You wouldn't like to take him a little glass of water?
Sonia: No.
75. **Hubert:** I'm afraid Inès may have somewhat overdone it with the Sancerre.
Inès: Don't humiliate yourself by pretending I'm a drunk, Hubert, your usual snide remarks will be quite sufficient...
76. **Henri:** Will you go and get dressed, Sonia?
Sonia: No.
77. **Hubert:** I know how to make Henri laugh! Henri, you feel like a laugh, ask Inès to describe a halo for you.
Inès: I'm not offended, you know.
78. **Henri:** I told him you were coming.
Sonia: I'm not going in there one more time, I hope that's clear.
79. **Hubert:** I hope he doesn't mean these delicious things I've been just eating.
Sonia: He does.

INDIRECT-INDIRECT

80. **Inès:** Whose fault is that?
Hubert: I'm not going to put up with this recital...
81. **Inès:** My husband has been published in Nature magazine, I fail to understand what's pathetic about that.
Hubert: Inès, I really don't need your help, darling.
82. **Henri:** It's not normal for him to stop crying suddenly just like that.
Inès: You mollycoddle him, Henri.
83. **Henri:** He wants a biscuit.
Sonia: He's just cleaned his teeth.
84. **Henri:** He's asking for a biscuit.
Sonia: He knows very well there's no biscuits in bed.
85. **Hubert:** Henri is R.A. at the I.A.P. and I'm lab-director at Meudon, in what way could I be responsible for his recruitment?
Sonia: You're a member of the National Committee, you can approve the promotion of people who don't work in your lab.
86. **Inès:** Why do you put me down in front of other people? I wish I could understand your pathological need you have to continually put me down in front of other people.
Hubert: I don't put you down, I was joking.
87. **Henri:** I won't let you go until you've apologised.
Sonia: Apologised for what? You couldn't take my side just for once in your life!

88. **Inès:** Did you have to tell him about the paper?

Hubert: Now you're shouting.....

89. **Henri:** He's agreed to a slice of apple.

Sonia: He's not having any apple, he's not having anything, you don't eat in bed, the subject is closed.

90. **Henri:** Why don't we give him the whole apple? It's good that he likes fruit.

Sonia: He's not having any more.

91. **Henri:** What's got into you?

Sonia: You'd rather he ruined the evening? At least we'll have a bit of peace.

92. **Hubert:** It's twenty past nine.

Inès: I cannot turn up with a ladder in my stocking!

93. **Henri:** Is there anything left in the kitchen?

Sonia: We cleaned it out. I thought it was tomorrow.

94. **Henri:** Are you out of mind?

Sonia: He's stopped. There you are.

95. **Henri:** This was a very important dinner for me!

Sonia: You're saying it's my fault!

96. **Henri:** He wants you to give him a cuddle.

Sonia: I've already given him a cuddle.

97. **Hubert:** Have you been here long?

Sonia: A year and a half.

98. **Henri:** If you like, I'll peel it and take it in to him.

Sonia: Spoil him. What do I care? Do what you like.

99. **Inès:** I've laddered my stocking!

Hubert: It doesn't show.

100. **Henri:** What difference is a little apple going to make to the course of history?

Sonia: If we give in on the apple, he'll know he can get us to give him in on anything.

101. **Inès:** I'm not going to visit people I've never met before with a ladder in my stocking.

Hubert: We're already half an hour late, we can't go back home, and we can't go shopping for stockings in the middle of the night. Let's just rise above it.

102. **Hubert:** Who's going to notice?

Inès: Who's going to notice? Everyone, except for you, if someone turns up at my house with a ladder in her stocking, the ladder's the first thing I notice.

103. **Henri:** You've terrified him.

Sonia: Henri, we've just discussed all this.

104. **Sonia:** Have they heard us?

Henri: Why, what did we say?

Notes

- 1 <<http://heralds.westkingdom.org/Ceremony/West/Chivalry.pdf> >
- 2 <http://www.zawaj.com/articles/marriage_ceremony_basics.html>
- 3 < <http://www.wfu.edu/~louden/Interpersonal/IPC%20Materials/GENDER.PPT#6>>
- 4 <<http://www.complete-review.com/reviews/rezay/lifex3.htm>>