

Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on one of C. S. Peirce's criticisms of G. W. F. Hegel: namely, that Hegel neglected to give sufficient weight to what Peirce calls "Secondness", in a way that put his philosophical system out of touch with reality. The nature of this criticism is explored, together with its relevant philosophical background. It is argued that while the issues Peirce raises go deep, nonetheless in some respects Hegel's position is closer to his own than he may have realised, whilst in others that criticism can be resisted by the Hegelian.

Writing in a critical response to *Hegel's Ladder*, the magisterial study of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* by H. S. Harris, John Burbidge adopts Peircean terminology in raising his central concerns:

What I miss, throughout Harris's commentary, is that healthy sense of reality that secondness provides. The commentary on each paragraph elaborates the text into an intricate web of philosophical and literary traditions. One acquires a rich sense of the polysemy of Hegel's writings – how they are filled with the mediated, reflective structures of thought. There is a lot of thirdness, to use Peirce's term. As well, Harris, with his acute aesthetic sensibility, weaves this network of mediation into a whole which collapses into a pervasive immediacy, into an intuitive apprehension of the total picture, or firstness. Missing are the brute facts of secondness which trigger thought's mediation, the evidence that everyday consciousness and self-conscious experience does not conform to our expectations. As I read the *Phenomenology*, Hegel's primary focus is on this concrete content of consciousness' *experience* and what it does to our confident pervasive assumptions, breaking them apart so that mediation is required.¹

In his reply to Burbidge, Harris defends himself by stating that "Hegel is 'a philosopher of thirdness'", so that he is right to approach the *Phenomenology* in the way he does; but he also admits that "we philosophers of thirdness *need* 'the dilemmas and struggles of real life'", and concludes: "But, of course, without secondness, there could not be any thirdness at all".²

This treatment of Hegel in Peircean terms is surprising in two respects. Firstly, it is surprising to see Peirce invoked in relation to Hegel at all, as the connection between the two has received hardly any critical attention.³ Secondly, it is curious to see Burbidge insisting that a reading of Hegel should offer "that healthy sense of reality that secondness provides", when Peirce himself was critical of Hegel in just these terms, for neglecting Secondness within his philosophical system. And yet, as I hope to show in this paper, we can come to see that the question Burbidge raises has considerable interest; for the debate between Peirce and Hegel on Secondness can be used to sharpen fundamental issues in the understanding of Hegel's thought, just as much as the more familiar debates between Schelling and Hegel, Marx and Hegel, Derrida and Hegel, and many others. It is the issue highlighted by Burbidge, concerning the Peircean category of Secondness, that I wish to explore here.⁴

As we shall see in what follows, Peirce held that a neglect for Secondness leads to a loss of "a healthy sense of reality" because of the role

that Secondness plays within his categorical scheme, which also comprises the categories of Firstness and Thirdness. As with any theory of categories, Peirce's claim is that these are the fundamental conceptions that can be used to classify everything there is or could be. Over the course of his career, Peirce approached these categories in different ways. In the 1870s, he saw them in terms of the logical structure of thought, while by the late 1880s, he was showing how these categories were manifested in the world, tracing monadic, dyadic and triadic elements in the subject matter of biology, psychology, physics and so on. Most important, for our purposes, is his slightly later phenomenological identification of the monadic, dyadic and triadic: put very briefly, Firstness is manifested in those aspects of things that concern their immediacy or individuality, where they are seen in monadic terms, as unrelated to anything else; Secondness is manifested in the awareness of things as 'other' or external, as things with which we *react* in a relational or dyadic manner; and Thirdness is manifested by the mediation between things, as when the relation between individuals is said to be governed by laws or grounded in the universals they exemplify, and hence is a triadic notion. Fundamental to Peirce's position is that philosophical errors follow if we attempt to prioritise one of these categories at the expense of the other two, although this is always a temptation.⁵

In particular, as far as Hegel is concerned, Peirce believed that he showed a lack of sensitivity to Secondness as the relational category, and thus neglected the relation of reaction and resistance that holds between things, including us and the world, where this is needed to prevent the reflective intellect assimilating everything to itself. As we shall see, Peirce therefore complains of Hegel – just as Burbidge complains of Harris's commentary on Hegel – that he is “missing the brute facts of secondness which trigger thought's mediation”, with the result that he is left (as critics from Schelling onwards have complained) with nothing but “arbitrary constructions of thought”.⁶ We must first look at this criticism in more detail (in sections I to III), and then explore its cogency (sections IV and V).

I

Peirce's criticism of Hegel concerning his treatment of the categories, including Secondness, is made at its clearest in the paper "On Phenomenology", which forms the text of Peirce's second Harvard lecture delivered on 2nd April 1903. This paper is one of the first in which Peirce offers a phenomenological approach to the investigation of the categories as "an element of phenomena of the first rank of generality", by focusing on the nature and structure of our experience and how the world appears to us: "The business of phenomenology is to draw up a catalogue of categories and prove its sufficiency and freedom from redundancies, to make out the characteristics of each category, and to show the relations of each to the others".⁷ Peirce says he will focus on the "universal order" of the categories, which form a "short list", and notes the similarity between his list and Hegel's, while denying any direct influence: "My intention this evening is to limit myself to the Universal, or Short List of Categories, and I may say, at once, that I consider Hegel's three stages [of thought] as being, roughly speaking, the correct list of Universal Categories."⁸ I regard the fact that I reached the same result as he did by a process as unlike his as possible, at a time when my attitude toward him was rather one of contempt than of awe, and without being influenced by him in any discernible way however slightly, as being a not inconsiderable argument in favor of the correctness of the list. For if I am mistaken in thinking that my thought was uninfluenced by his, it would seem to follow that that thought was of a quality which gave it a secret power, that would in itself argue pretty strongly for its truth".⁹

In Peirce's terminology, the "short list" comprises the categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, although he does not introduce that terminology until the next lecture. Here, he offers a characterisation of the first two categories in phenomenological terms, beginning with Firstness, which he identifies with *presentness* because of its immediacy. Peirce then turns to Secondness, which because of its relationality he characterises in terms of "*Struggle*", by which he means the resistance of the world to the self and vice versa, illustrating this with the examples of pushing against a door; being hit on the back of the head by a ladder someone is carrying; and seeing a flash of lightning in pitch darkness.¹⁰ He also argues that this resistance can be felt in the case of images drawn in the imagination, and other "inner objects", though this is felt less strongly. Then, at the beginning of the next section of the text, Peirce comes to the category of Thirdness; but here we do not get any phenomenological analysis of the category, but an account of why "no modern writer of any stripe, unless if be some obscure student like myself, has ever done [it] anything approaching to justice".¹¹

Now, Peirce offers a criticism of Hegel in relation to each of the three categories. Thus, in relation to Firstness, Peirce argues that while Hegel recognized "presentness" or "immediacy", he treated this as an "abstraction", as if such presentness could not be a genuine aspect of experience in itself, but only something arrived at by the "negation" of something more complex: "[Presentness] cannot be *abstracted* (which is

what Hegel means by the abstract) for the abstracted is what the concrete, which gives it whatever being it has, makes it to be. The present, being such as it is while utterly ignoring everything else, is *positively* such as it is".¹² In relation to Secondness, Peirce argues that Hegelians will tend to reduce "struggle" to a lawlike relation and hence to something general, and so will eliminate Secondness in favour of Thirdness.¹³ And in relation to Thirdness, Peirce claims that Hegel's position is insufficiently realist, so that like all "modern philosophers", Hegel is ultimately a nominalist.¹⁴

While each of these criticisms is clearly expressed, and repeated elsewhere,¹⁵ there is some difficulty in assessing their force in relation to Firstness and Thirdness. For, in relation to Firstness, while on the one hand Peirce's position might suggest that he wants to adopt a kind of phenomenological and ontological monadism or atomism in contrast to Hegel's holism, whereby "the first category" relates to "whatever is such as it is positively and regardless of aught else",¹⁶ on closer inspection Peirce's position appears to come closer to Hegel's, in so far as he ultimately refuses to accord Firstness any undue privilege, and gives it the status of a "mere potentiality, without existence".¹⁷ Thus, as one commentator has noted, in the final analysis, there is arguably a "predominance of thirdness in Peirce's treatment" of Firstness of a kind that he attributes to Hegel: "almost any act of the mind leads so immediately to thirdness [for Peirce]...that the priority of firstness is not only left behind, but begins to seem unimportant".¹⁸ Likewise, in relation to Thirdness, Peirce's criticism is also hard to pin down: for it is surprising that he should accuse Hegel of nominalism, when he *also* thinks that Thirdness is "the chief burden of Hegel's song",¹⁹ where Thirdness is predominantly associated by Peirce with realism about "generals" (such as laws and universals), and hence would seem to essentially involve an *anti*-nominalist position.

However such issues are dealt with,²⁰ it would appear that no such difficulties arise in relation to the category of Secondness. For here it seems that there are clear grounds for divergence between Peirce and Hegel, at least from Peirce's perspective. As with the category of Firstness, the central disagreement here concerns the relation between Secondness and Thirdness, and the Hegelian tendency (as Peirce sees it) to subsume the former under the latter. Thus, Peirce claims that "the idea of Hegel" is that "Thirdness is the one sole category"; and while he allows that "unquestionably it contains a truth", he argues that Hegel takes this view too far:

Not only does Thirdness suppose and involve the ideas of Secondness and Firstness, but never will it be possible to find any Secondness or Firstness in the phenomena that is not accompanied by Thirdness.

If the Hegelians confined themselves to that position they would find a hearty friend in my doctrine.

But they do not. Hegel is possessed with the idea that the Absolute is One. Three absolutes he would regard as a ludicrous contradiction *in adjecto*. Consequently, he wishes to make out that the three categories have not their several independent and irrefutable standings in thought. *Firstness* and *Secondness* must somehow be *aufgehoben*. But it is not true. They are no way refuted or refutable. Thirdness it is true involves Secondness and

Firstness, in a sense. That is to say, if you have the idea of Thirdness you must have had the idea of Secondness and Firstness to build upon. But what is required for the idea of a genuine Thirdness is an independent solid Secondness and not a Secondness that is a mere corollary of an unfounded and inconceivable Thirdness; and a similar remark may be made in reference to Firstness.²¹

While in relation to Firstness, a difficulty with this and related passages is that ultimately Peirce appears to treat Firstness as less “independent” than he here suggests, in respect of Secondness his position tends to remain rather more robust, as can be seen when the various dimensions of this issue are explored.

II

For Peirce, to insist on the importance of acknowledging “an independent solid Secondness” is to signal a commitment to a variety of related epistemological and metaphysical theses, all of which he sees as anti-Hegelian, and none of which he thinks should be compromised.

A first anti-Hegelian thesis that Peirce associates with Secondness is his opposition to what he views as Hegel’s speculative idealist project, which on Peirce’s account treats “the Universe [as] an evolution of Pure Reason”.²² According to this reading, Hegel is seen as wanting to offer a conception of the world in which everything can be explained, as from a divine perspective or (a similar thing) the perspective of “absolute knowing”, where there are therefore no sheer contingencies (so everything is ultimately *necessary*), or unsatisfactory regresses of explanation (so that the system as a whole is reflexively structured and hence *self-explanatory*). Hegel’s difficulty with Firstness and Secondness is therefore seen to be that he cannot acknowledge either the “bruteness” of certain features of the world (why some things are one way and not another),²³ or the contingency of certain events (why things happen as they do).²⁴

[I]f, while you are walking in the street reflecting upon how everything is the pure distillate of Reason, a man carrying a heavy pole suddenly pokes you in the small of the back, you may think there is something in the Universe that Pure Reason fails to account for; and when you look at the color *red* and ask yourself how Pure Reason could make *red* to have that utterly inexpressible and irrational positive quality it has, you will be perhaps disposed to think that Quality [i.e. Firstness] and Reaction [i.e. Secondness] have their independent standings in the Universe.²⁵

In a way somewhat reminiscent of Kierkegaard, Hegel is seen by Peirce as a paradigmatically “abstracted” philosopher,²⁶ whose absurd intellectual ambitions have led him to neglect the reality of the world around us (with its teeming variety, complexity, and “irresponsible, free, Originality”)²⁷ in the attempt to give the impression that reason can conquer all. To be committed to Secondness, therefore, is in part to be committed to the claim that the world will always lie outside the attempt to place it fully within the self-articulation of the Hegelian Idea, as a necessary structure apparently designed to explain and encompass everything.

A second thesis is an implication of this Peircean position: namely that a proper recognition of Secondness requires a greater commitment to experience or “experientialism”, as how the world is and goes on cannot be deduced from “Pure Reason” in what Peirce takes to be the Hegelian manner. Of course, Peirce himself is no crude empiricist,²⁸ and is happy to allow that “Hegel’s plan of evolving everything out of the abstractest conception by a dialectical procedure [is] far from being so absurd as the experientialists think”;²⁹ nonetheless, he holds that Hegel takes this to extremes, in a way that a proper acknowledgement of “the brute facts of secondness” (as Burbidge put it) would have prevented:

The scientific man hangs upon the lips of nature, in order to learn wherein he is ignorant and mistaken: the whole character of the scientific procedure springs from that disposition. The metaphysician begins with a

resolve to make out the truth of a forgone conclusion that he has never doubted for an instant. Hegel was frank enough to avow that it was so in his case. His “voyage of discovery” was undertaken in order to recover the very fleece that it professed to bring home.³⁰ The development of the metaphysician’s thought is a continual breeding in and in; its destined outcome, sterility. The experiment was fairly tried with Hegelianism through an entire generation of Germans. The metaphysician is a worshipper of his own presuppositions... The Absolute Knowledge of Hegel is nothing but G. W. F. Hegel’s idea of himself... If the idealist school will add to their superior earnestness the diligence of the mathematician about details, one will be glad to hope that it may be they who shall make metaphysics one of the true sciences... But it cannot be brought to accomplishment until Hegel is *aufgehoben*, with his mere rotation upon his axis. Inquiry must react against experience in order that the ship may be propelled through the ocean of thought...³¹

Like many other critics, Peirce is accusing Hegel here of speculative a priorism, which for Peirce is symptomatic of his lack of respect for Secondness.

A third thesis concerns Hegel’s idealism, which Peirce generally presents in a mentalistic manner, and thus as the view that the world is a “representation” of the mind. It is this form of idealism which he therefore thinks characterises “absolute idealism”, of the sort he attributes to the prominent American Hegelian Josiah Royce:

The truth is that Professor Royce is blind to a fact which all ordinary people will see plainly enough; that the essence of the realist’s opinion is that it is one thing to *be* and another thing to *be represented*; and the cause of this cecity is that the Professor is completely immersed in his absolute idealism, which precisely consists in denying that distinction.³²

Once again, Peirce makes clear that his view is that the Hegelians slip into this erroneous position because they fail to acknowledge how far reality is not something deducible from thought, but something that impinges on us “from outside”, in the manner of Secondness rather than Thirdness:

Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our own ideas. This is indeed without exaggeration the very epitome of falsity. Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of being represented... These things are utterly unintelligible as long as your thoughts are mere dreams. But as soon as you take into account that Secondness that jabs you perpetually in the ribs, you become aware of their truth.³³

Peirce thus claims that in his idealism, Hegel “has usually overlooked external secondness, altogether. In other words, he has committed the trifling oversight of forgetting that there is a real world with real actions and reactions. Rather a serious oversight that”.³⁴

Fourthly, Peirce also claims that because Hegel overlooks Secondness in this way, and thus ignores “the compulsion, the insistency, that characterises experience”,³⁵ Hegel also fails to accord sufficient ontological significance to the *individual*, as opposed to the universal and general: for it is this

individuality which is given to us in experience in this manner, as particular things impose themselves on us:

But to say that a singular thing is known by sense is a confusion of thought. It is not known by the feeling-element of sense [i.e. Firstness] but by the compulsion, the insistency [i.e. Secondness], that characterises experience. For the singular subject is real; and reality is insistency. That is what we mean by “reality.” It is the brute irrational insistency that forces us to acknowledge the reality of what we experience, that gives us our conviction of any singular.³⁶

Peirce therefore contrasts his own commitment to Duns Scotus’s conception of “Thisness” or *haecceity* to the Hegelian position, which he thinks thus fails to recognize that the individual is something over and above a collection of universals, because its neglect of Secondness leads to the prioritisation of Thirdness or generality in this way:

Hic et nunc is the phrase perpetually in the mouth of Duns Scotus, who first elucidated individual existence... Two drops of water retain each its identity and opposition to the other no matter in what or how many respects they are alike... The point to be remarked is that the qualities of the individual thing, however permanent they may be, neither help nor hinder its individual existence. However permanent and peculiar those qualities may be, they are but *accidents*; that is to say, they are not involved in the mode of being of the thing; for the mode of being of the individual thing is existence; and existence lies in opposition merely.³⁷

Finally, Peirce develops his conception of Secondness, and its relation to individuality or haecceity, against Royce’s view that the subject of a proposition is picked out by a general description.³⁸ For Peirce, this is to miss the role of indexicals in reference; and he thinks the reason an Hegelian like Royce overlooks this role is precisely because he neglects the significance of Secondness, whereby the particular individual manifests itself to us in a way that makes indexical reference possible. According to Peirce, Royce’s error was “to think that the real subject of a proposition can be denoted by a general term of the proposition; that is, that precisely what you are talking about can be distinguished from other things by giving a general description of it”.³⁹ Although in his early work in the 1860s this had also been Peirce view,⁴⁰ Peirce came to change his mind, partly as a result of the invention of quantifiers by himself and his pupil O. H. Mitchell in 1884, and partly also because this led him to take more seriously the Kantian distinction between intuitions (as singular) and concepts (as general) to be found in Kant’s “cataclysmic work”,⁴¹ *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Peirce’s mature view was that “it is not in the nature of concepts adequately to define individuals”,⁴² and that “The real world cannot be distinguished from a fictitious world by any description”.⁴³ Peirce thus argued instead that non-descriptive reference is made possible by the use of indexicals; and this in turn requires the recognition of the fact of Secondness in our experience, or (as he puts it in his unpublished critical review of Royce of 1885), “the Outward Clash”:

We now find that, besides general terms, two other kinds of signs are perfectly indispensable in all reasoning. One of these kinds is the *index*,

which like a pointing finger, exercises a real physiological *force* over the attention, like the power of a mesmerizer, and directs it to a particular object of sense. One such index at least must enter into every proposition, its function being to designate the subject of discourse... If the subject of discourse had to be distinguished from other things, if at all, by a general term, that is, by its particular characteristics, it would be quite true [as Royce argues] that its complete segregation would require a full knowledge of its character and would preclude ignorance. But the index, which in point of fact alone can designate the subject of a proposition, designates it without implying any characters at all. A blinding flash of lightning forces my attention and directs it to a certain moment of time with an emphatic “Now!”... [I]t is by volitional acts that dates and positions are distinguished... What I call volition is the consciousness of the discharge of nerve-cells, either into the muscles, etc., or into other nerve-cells; it does not involve the sense of time (i.e. not of a continuum) but it does involve the sense of action and reaction, resistance, externality, otherness, pair-edness. It is the sense that something has hit me or that I am hitting something; it might be called a sense of collision or clash. It has an outward and inward variety, corresponding to Kant’s outer and inner sense, to will and self-control, to nerve action and inhibition, to the logical types $A:B$ and $A:A$. The capital error of Hegel which permeates his whole system in every part of it is that he almost altogether ignores the Outward Clash. Besides the lower consciousness of feeling and the higher consciousness of intuition, this direct consciousness of hitting and of getting hit enters into all cognition and serves to make it mean something real.⁴⁴

It can be seen, therefore, that Peirce viewed Royce’s position as typically Hegelian, in failing to see that individual entities at particular times and places are identified for us through the dyadic process of being hit or hitting something through the “Outward Clash”, where this phenomenological feature of our experience was later to be referred to by Peirce as “Secondness”, qua “struggle”; and without this, Peirce believes, there could be no room in this Hegelian position for the role of indexicals in reference.

III

Having identified the issues which Peirce took to differentiate himself from Hegel in relation to Secondness, we can now turn to a consideration of the cogency of the associated criticisms that Peirce offers of the Hegelian position as he saw it. To do so, we must consider not only the strength of Peirce's arguments, but also whether they are well-directed: that is, whether the views Peirce is criticising really are Hegel's.

Before moving on to specifics, at a general level it may appear that there are grounds for doubt on the latter point: for, in characterising the motivations behind the Hegelian position, Peirce makes some rather implausible claims that suggest he may have had little understanding of his opponent's thought. Two aspects of Peirce's characterisation seem particularly vulnerable: first, that Hegel treats Secondness (and Firstness) as "refuted or refutable"⁴⁵ because it must be *aufgehoben*, and second that Hegel thinks it must be *aufgehoben* because "Hegel is possessed with the idea that the Absolute is One".⁴⁶ In presenting Hegel's position in this way, however, Peirce seems fairly obviously mistaken: for, firstly, Peirce misses the fact that for Hegel *aufgehoben* means not merely refuted, but also "preserved" and "raised up";⁴⁷ and secondly, all the evidence counts against a monistic reading of the Hegelian absolute, for example in Hegel's criticisms of Spinoza⁴⁸ and Schellingianism,⁴⁹ and in his definition of the Absolute as Concept (*Begriff*),⁵⁰ where this involves a complex interrelation of the categories of universality, particularity and individuality, rather than the reduction of the Absolute to a homogeneous unity. To this extent, therefore, it might be felt that Peirce has no warrant for claiming that Hegel's general outlook motivated him to treat Secondness in a way that can be legitimately criticised.

However, there is a third aspect to Peirce's general view of Hegel that would appear to many to have a greater degree of plausibility as an explanation for why Hegel might have come to neglect Secondness in just the manner that Peirce claims: this is Peirce's suggestion that Hegel wants to treat "the Universe [as] an evolution of Pure Reason" in a way that leaves no room for Secondness (or Firstness). For, this way of taking Hegel, as aiming to construct a complete explanatory system from some sort of self-positing first cause, forms a clear part of the *Rezeptionsgeschichte*, and constitutes a traditional basis for criticism, from the late Schelling onwards. Like Peirce, these critics accuse Hegel of failing to recognize the distinction between individuals on the one hand and concepts on the other, and in the process of therefore losing sight of the way in which thought alone cannot explain or encompass individuality. It is therefore possible to find in these critics concerns that prefigure Peirce's remarks concerning the "outward clash"; for example, in Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's account of sense-certainty, where Feuerbach accuses Hegel of trying to argue here that individuality is "untruth" and so that "the general is real", on the grounds that to sense-certainty each individual is equally "here" and "now", and so is no different from any other. In response, Feuerbach emphasises what Peirce would characterise as the Secondness of experience, in order to remind Hegel of the individuality that Feuerbach (like Peirce) thinks he neglects:

[According to Hegel] The “here” of the *Phenomenology* is in no way different from another “here” because it is actually general. But [in fact] the real “here” is distinguished from another “here” in a real way; it is an exclusive “here”. “This “here” is, for example, a tree. I turn around and this truth has disappeared.” This can of course happen in the *Phenomenology*, where turning around costs nothing but a little word. But, in reality, where I must turn my ponderous body around, the “here” proves to be a very real thing even behind my back. The tree delimits my back and excludes me from the place it already occupies. Hegel does not refute the “here” that forms of the object of sensuous consciousness; that is, an object distinct from pure thought. He refutes only the logical “here”, the logical “now”.⁵¹

In this way, therefore, many of Hegel’s earlier critics, who like Peirce interpreted his project in a rationalistic manner, arrived at an equally similar point of divergence; and as providing some explanation for his purported neglect of Secondness, this view of Hegel’s project has a much greater degree of plausibility. For, as earlier critics like Feuerbach had argued, there seems to be enough in Hegel’s writings to suggest that he took “the Universe to be an evolution of Pure Reason” in this manner, such as his notorious description of the *Logic* as “the expression of God has he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and finite mind”;⁵² his claim that in the transition from the *Logic* to the *Philosophy of Nature*, the Idea “freely releases itself”;⁵³ and his incorporation of the ontological argument.⁵⁴ Thus, while few serious interpreters of Hegel would be prepared to accept that Peirce’s discussion of *Aufhebung* and the Hegelian Absolute ring true, this rationalistic diagnosis of Hegel’s neglect for Secondness can claim to have more compelling evidence in its favour, and to command support from many other of Hegel’s critics.

Nonetheless, of course, even this reading of Hegel cannot be said to be beyond dispute, and defenders of Hegel might argue that Peirce is wrong to assume that Hegel’s project is as rationalistic as he suggests, just as they have argued in the same way against similar interpretations offered by Schelling, Feuerbach, and others. These interpreters have claimed that that way of characterising Hegel’s position as a form of Neoplatonic “emanation theory” misconstrues his philosophical ambition, which was not to offer the Idea as a kind of First Cause,⁵⁵ but to show rather than it is a mistake to treat reason as if it demands an answer of this kind, when in fact it might be satisfied without it, thus allowing room for the contingency of events and the sheer facticity of things.⁵⁶ On this view, then, Peirce would be wrong (just as Schelling and others were wrong) to think that Hegel needed to negate the “brute facts of secondness”, as if this were something that he had to do away with; on the contrary, it has been argued, Hegel’s aim is to *accommodate* such contingencies by showing that they are inevitable, and do not make it any more difficult for reason to see the world as place where it can be “at home”. In fact, on this sort of account, Hegel’s attitude might be compared to Peirce’s own as expressed in “A Guess at the Riddle”:

Most systems of philosophy maintain certain facts or principles as ultimate. In truth, any fact is in one sense ultimate, - that it so say, in its isolated aggressive stubbornness and individual reality. What Scotus calls

the haecceities of things, the hereness and nowness of them, are indeed ultimate. Why this which is here is such as it is, how, for instance, if it happens to be a grain of sand, it came to be so small and so hard, we can ask; we can also ask how it got carried here, but the explanation in this case merely carries us back to the fact that it was once in some other place, where similar things might naturally be expected to be. Why IT, independently of its general characters, comes to have any definite place in the world, is not a question to be asked; it is simply an ultimate fact. There is also another class of facts of which it is not reasonable to expect an explanation, namely, facts of indeterminacy or variety. Why one definite kind of event is frequent and another rare, is a question to be asked, but a reason for the general fact that of events some kinds are common and some rare, it would be unfair to demand. If all births took place on a given day of the week, or if there were always more on Sundays than on Mondays, that would be a fact to be accounted for, but that they happen in about equal proportions on all the days requires no particular explanation. If we were to find that all the grains of sand on a certain beach separated themselves into two or more sharply discrete classes, as spherical and cubical ones, there would be something to be explained, but that they are of various sizes and shapes, of no definable character, can only be referred to the general manifoldness of nature. Indeterminacy, then, or pure firstness, and haecceity, or pure secondness, are facts not calling for and capable of explanation. Indeterminacy affords us nothing to ask a question about; haecceity is the *ultima ratio*, the brutal fact that will not be questioned. But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable.⁵⁷

Just as Peirce tries to show here that Firstness and Secondness set limits to explanation in a way that nonetheless poses no threat to reason, so on the account we have been considering, Hegel does the same; it could therefore be argued that Hegel can leave more room for Peircean Secondness (and Firstness) than Peirce allows.

It might be said, however, that even if it is an exaggeration to claim that Hegel wanted to “account for” everything in the world in rationalistic terms, Peirce is still right to identify an unwillingness in Hegel to recognize a proper distinction between the individual and the conceptual, as a result of Hegel’s insistence that we “go beyond” Kant, and transcend this Kantian dichotomy (along with others).⁵⁸ On this reading, Hegel is taken to be exploiting the equivocal nature of Kant’s own position. For, on the one hand, Kant argued that knowledge requires the application of concepts formed by the understanding to intuitions or representations of particular objects furnished by sensibility (“Thoughts without content are empty”);⁵⁹ on the other hand, these “objects” do not seem to be real concrete individuals (tables, chairs, people etc.) because prior to conceptualisation by the understanding, sensibility is unable to yield any experience of such objects (“intuitions without concepts are blind”);⁶⁰ so, while Kant’s insistence that intuition and understanding are “heterogeneous factors”⁶¹ suggested that the complete determination of particulars cannot be derived from our concepts of them, Kant’s equal insistence that particulars cannot be

known except as falling under concepts suggested that particular individuals (such as tables, chairs etc.) could not be more than the exemplification of certain general characteristics. Hegel is thus seen as taking up the Kantian claim that “intuitions without concepts are blind”, in a way that leads to Hegel’s objective idealism: the individuals we experience are determined by the concepts they exemplify, so that individuality is nothing over and above universality, but is constituted by it, in a manner that the orthodox Kantian cannot accept.⁶²

As we have already seen, it is by returning to this more orthodox Kantian position that Peirce takes himself to be restoring a place for Secondness as an “independent” category, in opposition to what he takes to be the Hegelian view:

...the greatest merit of [Kant’s] doctrine...lay in his sharp discrimination of the intuitive and discursive processes of the mind... This was what emancipated him from Leibnizianism, and at the same time turned him against sensationalism. It was also what enabled him to see that no general description of existence is possible, which is perhaps the most valuable proposition that the *Critic* contains.⁶³

This suggests, then, that Peirce might be prepared to rest his account of Hegel’s neglect of Secondness not on the claim that Hegel is a monist, nor that he was a rationalistic Neoplatonist, but rather on the claim that Hegel wanted to do away with the crucial Kantian dichotomy between “the intuitive and discursive processes of the mind”, where Secondness relates to the former and Thirdness to the latter; and in so far as many of Hegel’s defenders would be willing to accept that this is indeed a dichotomy Hegel wished to transcend,⁶⁴ this can perhaps provide Peirce with the background he needs to show why Hegel might have come to treat Secondness in the way Peirce suggests, as the generality of thought comes to predominate over the “outward clash” and singularity of intuition.

We have found, then, that if Peirce is right to claim that Hegel had a distorted view of Secondness, there is a prima facie plausible diagnostic story that Peirce might tell to explain this distortion. We must therefore look more closely at the specific charges Peirce makes to show that in Hegel’s system Secondness *is* “refuted”, and see whether Peirce’s critique can also be made plausible at this level.

IV

At first sight, there may certainly appear to be a good deal of justice in Peirce's specific claims regarding Hegel's unwillingness to give Secondness its due, and Peirce's complaints here undoubtedly fit a certain traditional way of reading Hegel as a speculative metaphysician with an extravagantly idealist and a prioristic project. However, in many respects that traditional reading has been challenged in recent years, in ways that show a side to Hegel's thought in which a greater role for Peircean Secondness can perhaps be found.

The first issue, then, concerns how far Hegel leaves room for what Burbidge called "the brute facts of Secondness", such as the poke in the back "that Pure Reason fails to account for". On a traditional view, which Peirce seems to endorse, Hegel's position is seen as being Spinozistic, ruling out possibility or contingency, and rendering everything necessary. However, as several commentators have argued recently (including Burbidge), this is a mistaken picture of Hegel's position, for (as Hegel puts it) "Although it follows from discussion so far that contingency is only a one-sided moment of actuality, and must therefore not be confused with it, still as a form of the Idea as a whole it does deserve its due on the world of objects".⁶⁵ Here it is important to remember Hegel's distinction between what is actual and what exists or what is "immediately there" (*das unmittelbar Daseiende*),⁶⁶ where the actual is necessary but the existent is not, and where Hegel is quite happy to accept that (for example) the natural world is not fully "actual" in this sense, though it does of course exist. Thus, while Peirce might have been right to say that Hegel took a greater philosophical interest in actuality than in possibility and contingency, he was far from denying its reality: "It is quite correct to say that the task of science and, more precisely, of philosophy, consists generally in coming to know the necessity hidden under the semblance of contingency; but this must not be understood to mean that contingency pertains only to our subjective views and that it must therefore be set aside totally if we wish to attain the truth. Scientific endeavours which one-sidedly push in this direction will not escape the justified reproach of being an empty game and a strained pedantry".⁶⁷

Turning now to the second issue, of whether Hegel's neglect of Secondness can be seen in his corresponding neglect for the role of experience in the acquisition of knowledge, it is again a complex matter to decide whether Peirce is right in what he claims. Central to Peirce's position is the way in which he sees Hegel as a typical proponent of what in "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce identified as the "a priori method", and thus as someone who holds that our reason will lead us to a convergence on the truth; according to Peirce, Hegel therefore fails to recognize that unless there is a sufficient role for experience, this method cannot result in any stable consensus, as what is "agreeable to reason"⁶⁸ (like what is agreeable to taste) is "always more or less a matter of fashion",⁶⁹ which depends too much on the subjective dispositions of inquirers and not enough on how things are in the world. Peirce thus sees Hegel's dialectical approach as an attempt to reach truth in this rationalistic fashion, in the hope of showing

that each limited category or standpoint can lead to the next until we attain a category or standpoint for which no limitation can be found; but he doubts the feasibility of this enterprise, claiming that not everyone will find the moves Hegel makes or the criticisms he offers “rationally compelling”, so that in the end Hegel cannot claim to reach “absolute knowledge”, as a picture of the world to which we must all consent; rather, he can only appeal to those who already think like him and share his preconceptions:

[Hegel] simply launches his boat into the current of thought and allows himself to be carried wherever the current leads. He himself calls his method *dialectic*, meaning that a frank discussion of the difficulties to which any opinion spontaneously gives rise will lead to modification after modification until a tenable position is attained. This is a distinct profession of faith in the method of inclinations.⁷⁰

Thus, rather than guiding his inquiries by the “outward clash” of experience, Peirce claims that Hegel fails to see the significance of Secondness in this respect, because he hopes that by following “that which we find ourselves inclined to believe”⁷¹ (and thus “the method of inclinations”), we can be led to convergence, and so to truth.

Now, one difficulty in assessing Peirce’s criticism here is that he does not tell us precisely what he has in mind: Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, his *Logic*, or the *Encyclopaedia* system as a whole. As regards the *Phenomenology*, we have already seen that commentators such as Burbidge would choose to emphasise the role of Secondness in that work, as what moves consciousness on from one standpoint to the next is an awareness of how things around us do not fit how we conceive them to be.⁷² In the case of the *Logic*, Peirce may be correct to say that there is no role for experience as such here, as one category is seen to lead on to another, in accordance with “Hegel’s plan of evolving everything out of the abstractest conception by a dialectical procedure”;⁷³ but in fact Peirce allows that Hegel might be right to adopt this method here, commenting as we have seen that it is “far from being so absurd as the experientialists think”,⁷⁴ his only reservation being its ambitiousness: “[it] overlooks the weakness of individual man, who wants the strength to wield such a weapon as that”.⁷⁵ Peirce thus chooses to argue for the necessity of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness not in this dialectical manner, but by showing (in “A Guess at the Riddle”) how this triad plays a fundamental role in all the “fields of thought”, such as logic, metaphysics, psychology, physiology, biological development, and physics, as well as showing (in the later Harvard lectures) that they have a fundamental role in our phenomenology. It could be argued that by appealing to the sciences in support of his categorial theorizing in this way, Peirce is again showing a greater recognition of Secondness than Hegel, in acknowledging that the empirical nature of these sciences must play a role in warranting our speculations about the categories. But again this implied contrast between Peirce and Hegel is potentially misleading: for Hegel himself uses the second and third books of the *Encyclopaedia* (the *Philosophy of Nature* and *Philosophy of Mind*) in just this way, trying to show how the categories he has developed in the *Logic* can be used to inform our inquiries into the natural and human worlds, to which they must

themselves be compatible: “It is not only that philosophy must accord with the experience nature gives rise to; in its formation and in its development, philosophic science presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics”.⁷⁶ Hegel’s *Philosophy of Nature* and *Philosophy of Mind* can thus be read not as spurious attempts to use a priori methods to try to establish truths about the natural and human worlds that are in fact really established through the empirical sciences (as Peirce suggests at one point),⁷⁷ but rather as attempts to reflect on the categories that our inquiries into these areas employ, in order to “clarify” them⁷⁸ and make them more explicit, so that those inquiries can be made more fruitful, in a way that their empirical results will then attest to. Of course, none of this makes Hegel a straightforward empiricist, in confining knowledge to the evidence of the senses or treating that evidence as if it was somehow independent of or prior to our capacity for thought: but Peirce himself was no such empiricist either. Thus, while Peirce’s picture of Hegel as an a priori metaphysician and thus as an opponent of Secondness fits with a certain traditional interpretation,⁷⁹ we have seen how it can be argued that this does not do justice to the full story.⁸⁰

In fact, it is perhaps symptomatic of Peirce’s tendency to read Hegel in a rather one-sided way on this issue, that in the Royce review, where he accuses Hegel of making the “capital error” of ignoring “the Outward Clash”, the text from Hegel that he cites in support of this claim does not seem to substantiate it sufficiently. The text Peirce refers to is from the Remark to §7 of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, which Peirce renders as follows: “We must be in contact with our subject-matter,” says he [i.e. Hegel] in one place, “whether it be by means of our external senses, *or, what is better*, by our profounder mind and our innermost self-consciousness”⁸¹. This is in fact a paraphrase of part of the following:

The principle of *experience* contains the infinitely important determination that, for a content to be accepted and held to be true, man must himself *be* actively involved *with it*, more precisely that he must find any such content to be at one and in unity with the *certainty of his own self*. He must himself be involved with it, whether only with his external senses, or with his deeper spirit, with his essential consciousness of self as well. – This is the same principle that is today called faith, immediate knowing, revelation in the [outer] world, and above all in one’s *own* inner [world].⁸²

Aside from the fact that Peirce’s paraphrase is somewhat inaccurate (for example, there is nothing in the original corresponding to the phrase “or *what is better*”), Peirce’s way of using this remark by Hegel also fails to appreciate its context. For, Hegel’s aim here is not to contrast experience on the one hand with some form of knowledge acquired solely by “our profounder mind and our innermost self-consciousness” on the other, and certainly not to claim that the latter would be “better” than the former. Rather, he is simply registering the fact that some of his contemporaries (and the language he uses strongly suggests he has F. H. Jacobi in mind) have extended “experience” to include not just the evidence of our outer senses concerning the spatio-temporal world around us, but also the evidence of our experience of ourselves as subjects as well as of God. Hegel

is thus not saying that knowledge is better had without experience or “the Outward Clash”, but rather noting that his contemporaries have extended this notion of “the Outward Clash” beyond our awareness of the empirical world to our awareness of ourselves and of God, because otherwise we would feel alienated from the latter as much as without experience we would feel alienated from the former. But if this is all that Hegel is saying here, it would seem Peirce is wrong to take the passage in the way he does, as attempting to give priority to our “essential consciousness of self” as a form of non-experiential knowledge, when Hegel’s aim is to show how the concept of experience has come to be *extended to* knowledge of this kind, rather than being excluded from it (as many more traditional empiricists may have thought). Of course, it may be that Peirce would be critical of this extension;⁸³ but nonetheless the fact that Hegel here remarks upon it in the way he does in no way suggests that he was opposed to the “infinitely important determination” that “the principle of *experience* contains”, which is what Peirce wants to claim.

The Peircean might argue, however, that Peirce’s characterisation of Hegel’s method as a priori in Peirce’s sense can be shown to be justified, because Hegel’s lacks the commitment to *realism* that Peirce identifies with the “method of science” and which lies behind its recognition of the importance of experience in our inquiries. In a well-known passage from “The Fixation of Belief”, Peirce makes this connection clear, between the method of science, realism, and what he would later call Secondness:

To satisfy our doubts...it is necessary that a method [of inquiry] should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and any man, if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion. The new conception here involved is that of reality.⁸⁴

This then brings us to the third issue of dispute between Peirce and Hegel over Secondness: namely, the claim that Hegel is an idealist, who fails to see that experience is needed because our beliefs must be related to “something upon which our thinking has no effect”, whereas the coherentism of the dialectical method neglects to incorporate any such relation, leaving us to move from one standpoint to the next within the circle of thought.

In categorising Hegel as an idealist in this manner, it is plausible to think that Peirce was following the lead of F. E. Abbot, whose work had a major influence in taking Peirce’s thought in a realist direction.⁸⁵ In his book *Scientific Theism*, Abbot portrays all modern philosophy as nominalistic, and thus as idealistic in a mentalistic or subjectivist sense, so that for

modern philosophy, nominalism is “its root” and idealism “its flower”;⁸⁶ and he sees Hegel as exemplifying this trend:

Hegel, the greatest of the post-Kantian Idealists, says: “Thought, by its own free act, seizes a standpoint where it exists for itself, and generates its own object;” and again: “This ideality of the finite is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every true philosophy is Idealism.” This is the absolute sacrifice of the objective factor in human experience. Hegel sublimely disregards the distinction between Finite Thought and Infinite Thought: the latter, indeed, *creates*, while the former *finds*, its object. And, since human philosophy is only finite, it follows that *no* true philosophy is Idealism, except the Infinite Philosophy or Self-thinking of God.⁸⁷

It is likely that comments such as these encouraged Peirce to adopt this reading of Hegel.⁸⁸

However, while plausibly read as statements of mentalistic idealism when taken out of context in this way, it is not clear on closer inspection that the remarks Abbot cites here can bear the interpretative weight he places upon them. The first statement might be translated more accurately as follows: “Only what we have here is the free act of thought, that puts itself at the standpoint where it is for itself and where hereby it produces and gives to itself its object”.⁸⁹ This comes in the Introduction to the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, where Hegel is discussing the difference between philosophy and other forms of inquiry. Other inquiries, Hegel suggests, must presuppose their objects (such as space, or numbers), but philosophy need not do so, because philosophy investigates thought and the adequacy of our categories and so produces its own object simply through the process of inquiry itself, as this already employs thought and the categories. Thus, in saying here that (in Abbot’s translation) “Thought...generates its own object”, Hegel is not making the subjective idealist claim, that the world is created by the mind, but rather saying that in the *Logic*, thinking is not simply taken for granted as an object for philosophy to investigate, as thinking is inherent in the process of investigation itself.

Likewise, Abbot’s second quoted statement is not best read as a declaration of subjective idealism. For, although Hegel does indeed say in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* that “This ideality of the finite is the most important proposition of philosophy, and for that reason every genuine philosophy is *Idealism*”,⁹⁰ the context is again important here, as the corresponding passage from the *Science of Logic* makes clear:

The proposition that the finite is ideal [*ideell*] constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being [*wahrhaft Seiendes*]. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is how far this principle is actually carried out. This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion equally does not recognize finitude as a veritable being [*ein wahrhaftes Sein*], as something ultimate and absolute or as something underived, uncreated, eternal. Consequently the opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy has no significance. A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existences as such, would not deserve the name of philosophy; the

principles of ancient or modern philosophies, water, or matter, or atoms are *thoughts*, universals, ideal entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us, that is, in their sensuous individuality – not even the water of Thales. For although this is also empirical water, it is at the same time also the *in-itself* or *essence* of all other things, too, and these other things are not self-subsistent or grounded in themselves, but are *posited* by, are *derived* from, an *other*, from water, that is they are ideal entities.⁹¹

When looked at in detail, it is clear that Hegel is not conceiving of idealism here in mentalistic terms: for if he was, he could hardly claim that “[e]very philosophy is essentially an idealism”, as mentalistic idealism is a position held by few philosophers, and not by those classical philosophers directly and indirectly referred to here, such as Thales, Leucippus, Democritus and Empedocles, not to mention Plato and Aristotle – as Hegel clearly recognized.⁹² A better reading of the passage is to see Hegel as offering a picture of idealism not as mentalistic, but as *holistic*.⁹³ On this account, Hegel claims that finite entities do not have “veritable, ultimate, absolute being” because they are dependent on other entities for their existence in the way that parts are dependent on other parts within a whole; and idealism consists in recognizing this relatedness between things, in a way that ordinary consciousness fails to do.⁹⁴ The idealist thus sees the world differently from the realist, not as a plurality of separate entities that are “self-subsistent or grounded in themselves”, but as parts of an interconnected totality in which these entities are dependent on their place within the whole. It turns out, then, that idealism for Hegel is primarily an ontological position, which holds that the things of ordinary experience are ideal in the sense that they have no being in their own right, and so lack the self-sufficiency and self-subsistence required to be fully real. Once again, therefore, Abbot would seem to lack adequate textual support for his account of Hegel’s idealism.

As a result of misreading Hegel in this way, Abbot failed to recognize how much Hegel’s trajectory away from Kantian idealism resembled his own; and in following Abbot here, Peirce did the same. Much like Abbot (and later Peirce), Hegel complains that for Kant “the categories are to be regarded as belonging only to *us* (or as ‘subjective’),”⁹⁵ giving rise to the spectre of “things-in-themselves” lying beyond the categorial framework we impose on the world; to dispel this spectre, Hegel argues (again like Abbot and Peirce) that we must see the world as conceptually structured in itself: “Now, although the categories (e.g. unity, cause and effect, etc.) pertain to our thinking as such, it does not at all follow from this that they must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also determinations of objects themselves”.⁹⁶ Like Abbot (and Peirce), Hegel sees himself as reviving here a vital insight of classical philosophy, which the subjective idealism of modern thought has submerged: “It has most notably been only in modern times...that doubts have been raised and the distinction between the products of our thinking and what things are in themselves has been insisted on. It has been said that the In-itself of things is quite different from what we make of them. This separateness is the standpoint that has been maintained especially by the Critical Philosophy, against the conviction of

the whole world previously in which the agreement between the matter [itself] and thought was taken for granted. The central concern of modern philosophy turns on this antithesis. But it is the natural belief of mankind that this antithesis has no truth".⁹⁷ No less than Abbot and Peirce, therefore, Hegel was a realist concerning the relation between mind and world, where that relation is mediated by the conceptual structures inherent in reality, in a way that the nominalist and subjective idealist denies.

If this is so, then once again it can be argued that Peirce's case is undermined, that Hegel naturally adopted a dialectical method that had no role for Secondness: for, this involves the assumption that Hegel was a coherentist idealist, who rejected the hypothesis that "There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them"; in seeing Hegel as a realist, we do not have this reason to hold that Hegel to have neglected Secondness in this respect.

V

Thus far, therefore, we have given grounds for supposing that Peirce's critique of Hegel on Secondness is wide of the mark, in so far as Hegel can be shown not to have held many of the views that Peirce attributes to him, and which Peirce suggests led him to neglect that category in favour of Thirdness. However, I now want to turn to two remaining issues that Peirce identifies as differentiating his view from Hegel's – the issue of haecceity, and of indexicality – and to show that here there is a genuine difference between these two thinkers; but I want to suggest that on these issues Hegel can perhaps stand his ground in the face of Peirce's critique, and argue that Peirce's emphasis on Secondness in these respects is misplaced.

The doctrine of haecceity comes from Duns Scotus, and while its details are notoriously complex, it is evident in a general way why Peirce should associate it with Secondness.⁹⁸ For, as we have seen, Peirce distinguishes Secondness from Thirdness in so far as it relates to particularity, whereby the individual is differentiated from other things: "Secondness, strictly speaking, is just when and where it takes place, and has no other being; and therefore, different Secondnesses, strictly speaking, have in themselves no quality in common".⁹⁹ Secondness thus leads inevitably to the classical problem of individuation: how is it that individuals *can* be unique in this way, where any properties we attribute to them are universal and so can be shared by other individuals?:

A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically determine an other, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great problem of the *principle of individuation* which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.¹⁰⁰

Scotus's solution to this problem, which Peirce favours above the others, is to introduce the idea of *haecceity*, as the unique "Thisness" of the thing that makes it an individual, and which cannot be characterised in any way, for to characterise it would make it general again: "An index does not describe the qualities of an object. An object, in so far as it is denoted by an index, having *thisness*, and distinguishing itself from other things by its continuous identity and forcefulness, but not by any distinguishing characters, may be called a *hecceity*".¹⁰¹

Now, in so far as Peirce associates the doctrine of haecceity with Secondness in this way, I think it is right to see a real difference here with Hegel. This is not because, as some critics have suggested, Hegel does not recognize the status of individuals *at all*, and so failed to take the problem of individuation seriously;¹⁰² it is just that he was suspicious of answers to that problem which left the solution opaque, in so far as the "Thisness" that supposedly constitutes the individuality of the particular has no determination of any kind, where for Hegel this indeterminacy means that in fact it cannot serve an individuating role, and is rather utterly general. Hegel

famously makes this point when he writes as follows concerning sense-certainty, and its claim to grasp the particular thing in its sheer individuality as “This”:

It is as a universal...that we *utter* what the sensuous [content] is. What we say is: “This”, i.e. the *universal* This; or, “it is”, i.e. *Being in general*. Of course, we do not *envisage* the universal This or Being in general, but we *utter* the universal, in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we *mean* to say.¹⁰³

I take this and related passages to suggest that Hegel would reject the Peircean solution to the problem of individuation that he adopts from Scotus, and this his claim that Secondness involves haecceity.

But, the Peircean might ask: what then is Hegel’s solution to the problem of individuation, if it does not involve haecceity in this way? Very briefly, as I understand it, Hegel’s solution is to argue that what constitutes the individuality of a thing is its properties, each of which it may share with other things, but where the particular *combination* of these properties makes something an individual: so, while many other individuals also have properties that I possess (being of a certain height, colour, weight etc.), only I have the specific *set* of properties that determine me as an individual, and so make me who I am. Peirce’s conception of individuality means he would be dissatisfied with this, because he wants individuation to be something more than can be derived from the properties of the individual in this way, and so thinks that things could be different even if they were exactly alike in *all* qualitative respects:¹⁰⁴ but it is open to the Hegelian to deny this, and to argue that to say that it is the “Thisness” of each that would differentiate them is to make this differentiation wholly mysterious, for if “This” is indeterminate, *how can it* distinguish one thing from another?

Peirce might go on to claim, however, that where Hegel goes wrong is in failing to see that Peirce’s conception of Secondness here is vital to his view of *indexicality*, which picks out the individual as a “bare this”, and not as anything general:

An indexical word, such as a proper noun or demonstrative or selective pronoun, has force to draw the attention of the listener to some hecceity common to the experience of speaker and listener. By a hecceity, I mean, some element of existence which, not merely by the likeness between its different apparitions, but by an inward force of identity, manifesting itself in the continuity of its apparition throughout time and space, is distinct from everything else, and is thus fit (as it can in no other way be) to receive a proper name or be indicated as *this* or *that*.¹⁰⁵

Peirce argues therefore that in so far as “the index...designates [the subject of a proposition] without implying any characters at all”,¹⁰⁶ we can refer to the individual as a “this” which appears to us as an individual in the “ouward clash” of experience.

I take it that Hegel’s response to this final issue concerning Secondness reflects the previous one, and is also to be found in his discussion of sense-certainty: namely, that for indexicality to work, a description must be involved in the way the thing is picked out, otherwise what “this” refers to is indeterminate: is it (for example) the door in front of me that I am pushing,

the door in the wall, the wall in the building, the building in the city, and so on – what exactly is the “this” to which my indexical refers, outside some further specification of the *class* of things to which the “this” belongs?¹⁰⁷ Peirce writes: “We now find that, besides general terms, two other kinds of signs are perfectly indispensable in all reasoning. One of these kinds is the *index*, which like a pointing finger, exercises a real physiological *force* over the attention, like the power of a mesmerizer, and directs it to a particular object of sense”,¹⁰⁸ and gives the example of experiencing as a “Now!” a flash of lightening. But unless the flash is conceptualised in some way *as* a particular in distinction from other things (the sky against which it is set, the trees below it, and so on), how can we determine the “particular object of sense” to which the indexical is meant to refer?¹⁰⁹ Of course, in normal contexts, that specification is taken for granted, and so may not be articulated, making it possible to refer to something determinate by just saying “This”: but this background is important and should not be forgotten, as Peirce appears to do when he takes it that two speakers will know that “this” or “now” refers to a flash of lightening “without implying any characters at all”.¹¹⁰

However, if the Hegelian is arguing that we are incapable of referring to anything by pointing and just saying “This”, but must also categorise the individual in some general way (“This house”, “This tree” etc.), so that we must use descriptions in picking out individuals, does the Hegelian position have the implications which Peirce fears, and which he thinks Royce accepts: namely, “If the subject of discourse had to be distinguished from other things, if at all, by a general term, that is, by its peculiar characters, it would be quite true that its complete segregation [as an individual from other individuals] would require a full knowledge of its characters and would preclude ignorance”?¹¹¹ Peirce’s concern here is that the Hegelian neglects the role of indexicals altogether, and so can only use general descriptions to refer to individuals; but because any such description can never be specific enough to capture the individual (or at least would require a complete knowledge of all other individuals with which to contrast it), this would seem to put the individual out of reach.

Some interpreters of Hegel have indeed taken this to be his view;¹¹² but others have argued that this is one-sided,¹¹³ in so far as Hegel is not assuming that indexicals have *no* reference, but only that they cannot perform this role on their own, independent of a use within a context that helps determine what general kind the indexicals are referring to when we say “This”: so, the proper Hegelian view is that neither the indexical “This”, nor the universal description can pick out the individual on their own, but that both must operate together, where the universal serves to mark out the kind of individual to which we are referring using the indexical.

Now, it might be said that to criticise Peirce as having failed to see this is unfair, as it treats Peirce as if he thought Secondness (and hence individuality and indexicality) could be entirely independent of Thirdness (and hence generality), when (as Peirce emphasises in his Harvard lectures) he agrees with Hegel that each of these categories must involve the others: “Not only does Thirdness suppose and involve the ideas of Secondness and

Firstness, but never will it be possible to find any Secondness or Firstness in the phenomenon that is not accompanied by Thirdness”.¹¹⁴ Peirce might therefore be expected to agree with this Hegelian view of indexicality, and only to object to the way in which Hegel takes it too far, and moves to claim from this that “*Firstness* and *Secondness* must somehow be *aufgehoben*”.¹¹⁵

But, of course, we have precisely tried to show that this concern of Peirce’s is an exaggeration, and that it is possible to read Hegel in a way that shows him to have accorded just the same status to these categories as Peirce himself demanded: namely, as each requiring the others, and none as “refuted” or “refutable”. On this account, then, Hegel’s conception of the Peircean category of Secondness is close to Peirce’s own, so that on many of the issues raised by this category, Peirce and Hegel can find common cause in a way that Peirce failed to recognize, and which therefore may have surprised him.¹¹⁶

Notes

1 John W. Burbidge, "Secondness", *The Owl of Minerva*, 33 (2001-2), pp. 27-39, p. 30.

2 H. S. Harris, "Thirdness: A Response to the 'Secondness' of John Burbidge", *The Owl of Minerva*, 33 (2001-2), pp. 41-3, p. 43.

3 Probably the best-known discussion is Max H. Fisch, "Hegel and Peirce", in J. T. O'Malley, K. W. Algozin and F. G. Weiss (eds.), *Hegel and the History of Philosophy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 172-93; reprinted in his *Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 261-82. For other studies see: H. G. Townsend, "The Pragmatism of Peirce and Hegel", *Philosophical Review*, 37 (1928), pp. 297-303; Joseph Anthony Petrick, "Peirce on Hegel", unpublished PhD dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972; Gary Shapiro, "Peirce's Critique of Hegel's Phenomenology and Dialectic", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, XVII (1981), pp. 269-75; and Kipton E. Jensen, "Peirce and Educator: On Some Hegelisms", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, XL (2004), pp. 271-88.

4 References to the works of Peirce are given in the following form:

CP: *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols 1-6 edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, 1931-35, vols 7 and 8 edited by A. W. Burks, 1958 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press); references to volume and paragraph number

EP: *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, 2 vols, edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); references to volume and page number

MS: *The Charles S. Peirce Papers*, microfilm edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Photograph Service, 1966); reference numbers are those used by Richard Robin, *Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967)

WP: *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, edited by Max Fisch, Edward Moore, Christian Kloesel et al, currently 6 vols (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982-); references to volume and page number

References to the works of Hegel are given in the following form:

HW: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, 20 vols and index, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969-71); references to volume and page number.

5 Cf. EP II, 267: "According to the present writer [i.e. Peirce], these *universal categories* are three. Since all three are invariably present, a pure idea of any one, absolutely distinct from the others, is impossible; indeed, anything like a satisfactory clear discrimination of them is a mark of long and active meditation. They may be termed *Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness*".

6 Burbidge, "Secondness", p. 31.

7 EP II, 148 (CP 5.43).

8 Cf. also CP 8.213 and CP 8.267. It is not immediately clear what Peirce meant by Hegel's "stages of thought", and thus what in Hegel he took to correspond to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. For discussion of some of the complexities here, see Martin Suhr, "On the Relation of Peirce's 'Universal Categories' to Hegel's 'Stages of Thought'", *Graduate Studies Texas Tech University*, 23 (1981), pp. 275-9.

9 EP II, 148 (CP 5.43). Cf. also CP 8.329.

10 EP II, 150-1 (CP 5.45). Cf. also CP 8.330.

11 EP II, 155-6 (CP 5.59). Cf. also CP 7.528.

12 EP II, 150 (CP 5.44).

13 EP II, 151-2 (CP 5.46).

14 EP II, 156-7 (CP 5.61).

15 For similar criticisms of Hegel on Firstness see e.g. CP 1.533 and CP 1.302. And for similar criticisms of Hegel on Thirdness see e.g. CP 8.258 and EP II, 143 (CP 5.37). Criticisms of Hegel on Secondness will be referred to throughout this paper.

16 EP II, 150 (CP 5.44).

17 CP 1.328.

18 John F. Boler, *Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963), p. 123.

19 EP II, 155 (CP 5.59).

20 I consider them further in “Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Firstness”, *International Yearbook of German Idealism* (forthcoming), and in “Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist?”, *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, XLI (2005), pp. 65-99.

21 EP II, 177 (CP 5.90-1). Cf also CP 8.268; CP 1.524; CP 4.354; EP II, 345 (CP 5.436); EP II, 164 (CP 5.90).

22 EP II, 177 (CP 5.92).

23 Cf. CP 2.85; EP I, 363 (CP 6.305); and CP 7.511: “Light, for example, moves over 300,000,000 centimetres per second... The explanation of the laws of nature must be of such a nature that it shall explain why these quantities should have the particular values they have. But these particular values have nothing rational about them. They are mere arbitrary Secondness”.

24 Cf. CP 6.218: “Now the question arises, what necessarily resulted from that state of things [i.e. potential being]? But the only sane answer is that where freedom was boundless nothing in particular necessarily resulted. In this proposition lies the prime difference between my objective logic and that of Hegel. He says, if there is any sense in philosophy at all, the whole universe and every feature of it, however minute, is rational, and was constrained to be as it is by the logic of events, so that there is no principle of action in the universe but reason. But I reply, this line of thought, though it begins rightly, is not exact. A logical slip is committed; and the conclusion reached is manifestly at variance with observation. It is true that the whole universe and every feature of it must be regarded as rational, that is as brought about by the logic of events. But it does not follow that it is constrained to be as it is by the logic of events; for the logic of evolution and of life need not be supposed to be of that wooden kind that absolutely constrains a given conclusion. The logic may be that of the inductive or hypothetic inference. This may-be is at once converted into must-be when we reflect that among the facts to be accounted for are such as that, for example, red things look red and not blue and *vice versa*. It is obvious that that cannot be a necessary consequence of abstract being. The effect of this error of Hegel is that he is forced to deny [the] fundamental character of the two elements of experience [i.e. Firstness and Secondness] which cannot result from deductive logic”.

25 EP II, 177-8 (CP 5.92).

26 Cf. CP 2.258, where Peirce contrasts “the philosopher’s high walled garden” with “the market place of life, where facts hold sway” – where the context of a discussion of the principle of excluded middle suggests strongly that “the philosopher” in question may well be Hegel.

27 CP 2.85.

28 Cf. EP II, 153-4 (CP 5.50): “But without beating longer round the bush, let us come to close quarters. Experience is our only teacher. Far be it from me to enunciate any doctrine of a *tabula rasa*. For as I said a few minutes ago, there is manifestly not one drop of principle in the whole vast reservoir of established scientific theory that has sprung from any other source than the power of the human mind to *originate* ideas that are true. But this power, for all it has accomplished, is so feeble that as ideas flow from their springs in the soul, the truths are almost drowned by a flood of false notions; and that which experience does is gradually, and by a sort of fractionation, to precipitate and filter off the false ideas, eliminating them and letting the truth pour on in its mighty current”. Cf. also EP I, 274 (CP 1.404); CP 2.755; CP 4.91; and CP 6.492.

29 EP I, 256 (CP 1.268).

30 I take it that this is a reference to Hegel’s comments on the circularity of his philosophical system: cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel’s Science of Logic*, translated by A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 71 [HW V: 70-1] and G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), §§15-17, pp. 39-41 [HW VIII: 60-63].

31 CP 8.118. Cf. also EP I, 237 (CP 8.45) and CP 8.112.

32 CP 8.129.

33 CP 6.95.

34 EP I, 256 (CP 1.368). This aspect of Peirce's critique of Hegel has been emphasised by Drucilla Cornell: "The Category of Secondness is the key to understanding Peirce's break with Hegel's absolute idealism. Secondness is the real that resists, or what Peirce himself has called 'the Outward Clash.' Secondness is that against which we struggle and which demands our attention to what is outside ourselves and our representational schema" (Drucilla Cornell, *Transformations* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 26).

35 CP 6.340.

36 CP 6.340. Cf. also CP 6.374 and CP 8.266.

37 CP 1.458.

38 For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Christopher Hookway, "Truth and Reference: Peirce versus Royce", in his *Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 108-34.

39 EP I, 232 (CP 8.41).

40 Cf. WP 2, 180: "Every cognition we are in possession of is a judgement whose subject and predicate are general terms".

41 EP I, 232 (CP 8.41).

42 CP 3.612.

43 CP 2.337.

44 EP I, 233 (CP 8.41).

45 EP II, 177 (CP 5.91).

46 Ibid.

47 Cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §96 Addition, p. 154 [HW VIII: 204-5] and *Science of Logic*, p. 107 [HW V: 114].

48 Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, 3 vols (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1892-96), III, p. 288 [HW XX: 166]: "As all differences and determinations of things and of consciousness simply go back into the One substance, one may say that in the system of Spinoza all things are merely cast down into this abyss of annihilation. But from this abyss nothing comes out".

49 Cf. Hegel's famous jibe against Schelling: "To pit this single insight, that in the Absolute everything is the same, against the full body of articulated cognition, which at least seeks and demands such fulfilment, to palm of its Absolute as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black – this is cognition naively reduced to vacuity" (G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 9 [HW III: 22]).

50 Cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §160 Addition, p. 237 [HW VIII: 308].

51 Ludwig Feuerbach, "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy", translated by Zawar Hanfi in *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 53-96, pp. 78-9; reprinted in *G. W. F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, edited by Robert Stern, 4 vols (London: Routledge, 1993), I, p. 118.

52 Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 50 [HW V: 44].

53 Ibid., p. 843 [HW VI: 573].

54 Cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §51, pp. 98-100 [HW VIII: 135-7].

55 In fact, if anyone it is Peirce himself who comes close to such emanationism: cf. CP 6.219: "I say that nothing *necessarily* resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom. That is, according to deductive logic. But such is not the logic of freedom or possibility. The logic of freedom, or potentiality, is that it shall annul itself. For if it does not annul itself, it remains a completely idle and do-nothing potentiality; and a completely idle potentiality is annulled by its complete idleness".

56 Very broadly speaking, this approach is characteristic of the so-called "non-metaphysical" approaches to Hegel that are currently in vogue. The term "non-metaphysical" itself may be traced back to Klaus Hartmann's classic article "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View", in Alasdair MacIntyre (ed), *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*

(Garden City: Doubleday, 1972), and various proponents of the view might be said to include Terry Pinkard, Robert Pippin, Alan White, Paul Redding and many others (although there is no complete unanimity in this approach). I have argued elsewhere that in fact a “non-metaphysical” reading can be found considerably earlier in the *Rezeptionsgeschichte*, such as in the work of the British Hegelians: see Robert Stern, “British Hegelianism: A Non-Metaphysical View?”, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 2 (1994), pp. 293-321.

57 EP I, 274-5 (CP 1.405).

58 Cf. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, III, p. 441 [HW XX: 347-8]: “For Kant says that in the mind, in self-consciousness, there are pure conceptions of the understanding and pure sensuous perceptions; now it is the schematism of the pure understanding, the transcendental faculty of the imagination, which determines the pure sensuous perception in conformity with the category and thus constitutes the transition to experience. The connection of these two is again one of the most attractive sides of the Kantian philosophy, whereby pure sensuousness and pure understanding, which were formerly expressed as absolute opposites, are now united. There is thus here present a perceptive understanding or an understanding perception; but Kant does not see this, he does not bring these thoughts together: he does not grasp the fact that he has here brought both sides of knowledge into one, and has thereby expressed their implicitude. Knowledge itself is in fact the unity and truth of both moments; but with Kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something particular, and they are only united in an external, superficial way, just as a piece of wood and a leg might be bound together by a cord”.

59 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A51/B75.

60 Ibid.

61 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, §76.

62 For a recent attempt to draw a contrast between Kant and Hegel along these lines, see Paul Guyer, “Thought and Being: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy”, in Frederick C. Beiser (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, 1st edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.171-210.

63 CP 1.35.

64 Cf. Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 9, where he characterises Hegel as abandoning “the very possibility of a clear distinction between concept and intuition”; and John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 41-45.

65 Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §145 Addition, p. 219 [HW VIII: 286] (where the translators use “ob-ject” as their rendering of “Gegenstand” as opposed to “Objekt”).

66 Ibid., §143 Addition, pp. 216-7 [HW VIII: 283]. Cf. also *ibid.*, §6, pp. 29-30 [HW VIII: 48]: “In common life people may happen to call every brain wave, error, evil, and suchlike “actual,” as well as every existence, however wilted and transient it may be. But even for our ordinary feeling, a contingent existence does not deserve to be called something-actual in the emphatic sense of the word; what contingently exists has no greater value than that which something-possible has; it is an existence which (although it is) can just as well *not be*. But when I speak of actuality, one should, of course, think about the sense in which I use this expression, given the fact that I dealt with actuality too in a quite elaborate *Logic*, and I distinguished it quite clearly and directly, not just from what is contingent, even though it has existence too, but also, more precisely, from being-there, from existence, and from other determinations”.

67 Ibid., §145 Addition, p. 219 [HW VIII: 286-7].

68 EP I, 119 (CP 5.382).

69 Ibid.

70 CP 5.382 note.

71 EP I, 119 (CP 5.382).

72 Cf. Burbidge, “Secondness”, p. 31: “[In the *Phenomenology*] Hegel is deciphering those elementary encounters with reality – some generic and oft repeated, others unique to an historical epoch – that are embedded within our common experience and are the source

of so much of what we call knowledge. That fundamental analysis exposes and explains the rational necessity underlying all of the literary accounts and philosophical theories that may be used to illustrate each stage. Apart from that brute encounter with secondness, those accounts and theories are just arbitrary constructions of thought, the illusions a particular species has used to insulate it from reality". Peirce himself recognizes a way of taking Hegel's method that would allow a role for experience in this way: cf. CP 2.46: I will first describe [Hegel's] method generically... Hegel begins, then, by assuming whatever appears most evident to an utterly unreflecting person, and sets it down. The only difference between the unreflecting person and Hegel, as he is in this mood, is that the former would consider the subject exhausted, and would pass to something else; while Hegel insists upon harping on that string until certain inevitable difficulties are met with... He pushes his objection for all it is worth... Hegel is anxious not to allow "foreign considerations" to intervene in the struggle which ensues – that is to say, no suggestions from a more advanced stage of philosophical development. I cannot see that it would conflict with the spirit of the general method to allow suggestions from experience, provided they are such as would be inevitable, and such as would be within the grasp of thought which for the moment occupies the theatre". For a more critical way of putting this point, cf. CP 8.110.

73 EP I, 256 (CP 1.368).

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid. Cf. CP 2.32: "What has been said of the utter impracticability of any one man's actually executing the design of the *Critic of Pure Reason* is a hundredfold more true of Hegel's *Logic*..."

76 G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, translated by M. J. Petry, 3 vols (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), §246, I, p. 197 [HW IX: 15].

77 EP I, 121 (CP 5.385): "The Hegelian system recognizes every natural tendency of thought as logical, although it be certain to be abolished by counter-tendencies. Hegel thinks there is a regular system in the succession of these tendencies, in consequence of which, after drifting one way and the other for long time, opinion will at last go right. And it is true that metaphysicians get the right ideas at last; Hegel system of Nature represents tolerably the science of that day; and one may be sure that whatever scientific investigation has put our of doubt will presently receive *a priori* demonstration on the part of the metaphysicians."

78 Cf. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, p. 37 [HW V: 27]: "As impulses the categories are only instinctively active. At first they enter consciousness separately and so are variable and mutually confusing; consequently they afford to mind only a fragmentary and uncertain actuality; the loftier business of logic therefore is to clarify these categories and in them to raise mind to freedom and truth".

79 For a recent, and sophisticated, attempt to revive aspects of that interpretation, see Alison Stone, *Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel's Philosophy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005).

80 This is not to deny, of course, that no real differences in Peirce's and Hegel's approach to developing a theory of the categories remain, where in particular the way in which each viewed the relation between the categories and formal logic is significantly divergent (Peirce stressing the importance of the latter, and Hegel questioning it); but this difference has little to do with the issue of Secondness.

81 EP I, p. 233, note.

82 Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, § 7, p. 31 [HW VIII: 49-50]. The passage in German reads as follows: "Das Prinzip der *Erfahrung* erhält die unendlich wichtige Bestimmung, daß für das Annehmen und Fürwahrhalten eines Inhalts der Mensch selbst *dabei sein* müsse, bestimmter, daß er solchen Inhalt mit *der Gewißheit seiner selbst* in Einigkeit und vereinigt finde. Er muß selbst dabei sein, sei es nur mit seinen äußerlichen Sinnen oder aber mit seinem tieferen Geiste, seinem wesentlichen Selbstbewußtsein. – Es ist dies Prinzip dasselbe, was heutigentags Glauben, unmittelbares Wissen, die Offenbarung im Äußeren und vornehmlich im *eigenen* Innern genannt worden ist". The editors of WP cite the 1827 edition of the *Encyclopaedia* as the work actually owned by Peirce (see WP V, 447); but

the text is virtually the same as the one for the 1832-45 edition used in HW that is quoted here.

83 Cf. EP I, 234 (CP 8.43): “[Dr. Royce and his school] so overlook the Outward Clash, that they do not know what experience is. They are like Roger Bacon, who after stating in eloquent terms that all knowledge comes from experience, goes on to mention spiritual illumination from on high as one of the most valuable kinds of experiences”. Hegel might be taken to agree with Peirce’s scepticism here, when he comments that “[F]eelings concerning right, ethical life, and religion are feelings – and hence an experience – of the kind of content that has its root and its seat in thinking alone”, and so should not be confused with the notion of experience used in the empirical sciences (Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §8, p. 32 [HW VIII: 51-2]).

84 EP I, 120 (CP 5.384).

85 Helpful discussions of the influence of Abbot on Peirce can be found in Daniel D. O’Connor, “Peirce’s Debt to F. E. Abbot”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 25 (1964), pp. 543-64; Max H. Fisch, “Peirce’s Progress from Nominalism Toward Realism”, *Monist* 51 (1967), pp. 159-77; Christopher Hookway, *Peirce* (London: Routledge, 1985), pp. 113-6. For biographical details on Peirce’s connections with Abbot, see Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993).

86 Francis Ellingwood Abbot, *Scientific Theism* (London: Macmillan, 1885; reprinted New York: AMS Press, 1979), p. 9.

87 *Ibid.*, p. 179.

88 This issue is also indirectly relevant to the dispute between Abbot and Royce, in which Peirce was also involved, where Royce accused Abbot of plagiarising Hegel, and Peirce came to Abbot’s defence. In one of the pamphlets Abbot had published in which he responded to Royce, Abbot insists that his position is not to be compared to Hegel’s: “I deny that I ‘borrowed’ my realistic theory of universals from the idealist Hegel, whether consciously or unconsciously. The charge is unspeakably silly. Realism and idealism contradict each other more absolutely than protectionism and free-trade” (F. E. Abbot, *Professor Royce’s Libel: A Public Appeal for Redress to the Corporation and Overseers of Harvard University* (Boston: Geo. H. Ellis, 1891), p. 15). Abbot’s protestations on this matter no doubt had an influence on Peirce’s understanding of the relation between Hegel’s position and his own.

89 Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §17, p. 41 [HW VIII: 63], translation modified. The original is as follows: “Allein es ist dies der freie Akt des Denkens, sich auf den Standpunkt zu stellen, wo es für sich selber ist und *sich* hiermit *seinen Gegenstand selbst erzeugt und gibt*”.

90 *Ibid.*, §95 Addition, p. 152 [HW VIII: 203].

91 Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 154-5 [HW V: 172].

92 Cf. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, II, pp. 43-4 [HW XIX: 54-5]: “[T]he idealism of Plato must not be thought of as being subjective idealism, and as that false idealism which has made its appearance in modern times, and which maintains that we do not learn anything, are not influenced from without, but that all conceptions are derived from out of the subject. It is often said that idealism means that the individual produces from himself all his ideas, even the most immediate. But this is an unhistoric, and quite false conception; if we take this rude definition of idealism, there have been no idealists amongst the philosophers, and Platonic idealism is certainly far removed from anything of this kind.”

93 Cf. Kenneth R. Westphal, *Hegel’s Epistemological Realism* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), p. 143: “Hegel’s idealism is thus an ontological thesis, a thesis concerning the interdependence of everything these is, and thus is quite rightly contrasted with epistemologically based subjective idealism”, and his “Hegel’s Attitude Toward Jacobi in ‘The Third Attitude of Thought Toward Objectivity’”, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 27 (1989), pp. 135-56, p. 146: “The basic model of Hegel’s ontology is a radical ontological holism”. Cf. also Thomas E. Wartenberg, “Hegel’s Idealism: The Logic of Conceptuality”, in Frederick C. Beiser (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, 1st edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 107: “[Hegel’s] manner of characterizing his

idealism emphasizes that it is a form of holism. According to this view, individuals are mere parts and thus are not fully real or independent". For further discussion of the issues raised here, see Robert Stern, "Hegel's Idealism", in Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

94 Cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §45 Addition, p. 88 [HW VIII: 122: "For our ordinary consciousness (i.e., the consciousness at the level of sense-perception and understanding) the ob-jects that it knows count as self-standing and as self-founded in their isolation from one another; and when they prove to be related to each other, and conditioned by one another, their mutual dependence upon one another is regarded as something external to the ob-ject, and not as belonging to their nature. It must certainly be maintained against this that the ob-jects of which we have immediate knowledge are mere appearances, i.e., they do not have the ground of their being within themselves, but within something else."

95 Ibid., §42 Addition, p. 85 [HW VIII: 118-9].

96 Ibid., pp. 85-6 [HW VIII: 119].

97 Ibid., §22 Addition, p. 54 [HW VIII: 79]. Cf. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, pp. 45-6 [HW V: 38].

98 The fullest discussion of the relation between Peirce and Scotus on this issue can be found in Boler, *Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism*.

99 CP 1.532.

100 EP CP 5.107.

101 CP 3.434. Cf also CP 1.458 and EP I, 274-5 (1.405): "In truth, any fact is in one sense ultimate, - that is to say, in its isolated aggressive stubbornness and individual reality. What Scotus calls the haecceities of things, the hereness and nowness of them, are indeed ultimate".

102 Cf. Karl Löwith, "Mediation and Immediacy in Hegel, Marx and Feuerbach", in W. E. Steinkraus (ed), *New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 119-41, p. 140: "Hegel's answer is abstract: what remains is only the 'universal' which is indifferent to everything that exists here and now".

103 Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 60 [HW III: 85].

104 Cf. CP 1.458, cited above.

105 CP 3.460.

106 EP I, 232 (CP 8.41). Cf. CP 3.361: "The index asserts nothing; it only says "There!" It takes hold of our eyes, as it were, and forcibly directs them to a particular object, and there it stops"; and CP 3.434: "A sign which denotes a thing by forcing it upon the attention is called an *index*. An index does not describe the qualities of its object. An object, in so far as it is denoted by an index, having *thisness*, and distinguishing itself from other things by its continuous identity and forcefulness, but not by any distinguishing characters, may be called a *hecceity*".

107 Cf. Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 143-4: "For what do these terms ['this', 'now' and 'here'] embrace? Take 'now': does it mean this punctual instant, this hour, this day, this decade, this epoch? It can mean all of these, and others in different contexts. But, for it to mean something for me, and not just be an empty word, there must be something else I could say to give a shape, a scope, to this 'now'; let it be a term for a time period, such as 'day' or 'hour', or some description of the even or process or action that is holding my attention and hence defining the dimensions of my present... Any attempt at effective awareness of the particular can only succeed by making use of a descriptive, i.e. general, terms. The purely particular is 'unreachable'".

108 EP I, 232 (CP 8.41).

109 Cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia Logic*, §24 Addition, pp. 57-8 [HW VIII: 83]: "Thus man is always thinking, even when he simply intuits; if he consider something or other he always consider it as something universal, he fixes on something singular, and makes it stand out, thus withdrawing his attention from something else, and he takes it as something abstract and universal, even though it is universal in a merely formal way".

110 It might be said, however, that Peirce's examples are meant to allow for a kind of immediate reference in this way, because in these examples only one item is actually salient – such as the flash of lightening, where in saying “Now!” it is only this that could be referred to, as this is all that stands out in the situation. Even if this were plausible in the cases Peirce describes, however, it is clear that this would not work as a *general* account of indexicality, where it is rare that only one thing could be salient in this way.

111 EP I, 232 (CP 8.41).

112 Cf. Taylor, *Hegel*, p. 144; Ivan Soll, *An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969), pp. 91-110; Gilbert Plumer, “Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference”, *Philosophical Topics*, 11 (1980), pp. 71-94.

113 Cf. Katharina Dulkeit, “Can Hegel Refer to Particulars?”, *The Owl of Minerva*, 17 (1986), pp. 181-94, reprinted in Jon Stewart (ed), *The “Phenomenology of Spirit” Reader* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 105-121.

114 EP II, 177 (CP 5.90).

115 Ibid.

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